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ABSTRACT  
 
 In 1790, 1804, and 1819, the U.S. House of Representatives debated measures intended 
to restrict slavery and the transatlantic slave trade. During these three debates, slaveholding 
representatives, primarily from the Lower South, attempted to call into question the general 
government’s right to discuss and legislate on slavery, contending that, except for in a few 
specific instances outlined in the Constitution, slavery was purely a state matter, not a national 
one.  Their opponents employed a variety of tactics to counter this idea. One particularly 
effective approach was an expression of concern for the impact of slavery and the slave trade on 
the national character—the nation’s honor or reputation among other nations of the Atlantic 
world. Those who invoked concern for the national character did so as a way to keep slavery and 
the transatlantic slave trade in the national dialogue and legitimize these issues as national 
matters over which the general government possessed authority.  In 1790, in response to three 
antislavery memorials sent to Congress, a few representatives used national character and 
national interest to combat the contention that the slave trade and slavery were not national 
issues. In 1804, following South Carolina’s decision to reopen the transatlantic slave trade, 
members of the House invoked anxiety for the national character to censure the state’s actions, 
using national character to discuss imposing a tax on the transatlantic slave trade. In 1819 and 
1820, as the House debated a proposal to restrict slavery in the new state of Missouri, 
representatives who favored restriction used concern for the impact of the spread of slavery on 
 
iii  
the national character to promote the general government’s authority to impose the restriction.  
During all three debates, members of the House of Representatives used concern over what other 
nations would think of the United States to validate discussion of antislavery measures in 
Congress. Examining these debates about slavery and the slave trade through the lens of national 
character provides valuable insight to the ambiguous relationship between slavery and the 
general government, as well as the relationship between slavery and the founding principles of 
the United States. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 In 1819, antislavery advocate Robert Walsh wrote, “Since our independence, slave 
holding has seemed to be fairly let loose to the Briton for the purposes of self-congratulation, and 
of the execration of American existence.”1  Walsh wrote his book to refute several accusations 
Great Britain had leveled at the United States in recent years; among these accusations was that 
“The institution of slavery is the foulest blot in the national character of America; its existence in 
her bosom is an atrocious crime—the consummation of wickedness, and admits of no sort of 
apology from her situation.”2  Walsh acknowledged that slavery was the point upon which the 
United States as a nation was most vulnerable to censure from European nations such as 
England, listing several additional accusations from the British toward the United States.  One of 
these was the remarkably injurious statement “that her congress has remained indifferent to 
[slavery’s] enormities.”3 
 This last accusation was far from true.  Issues regarding slavery and the slave trade came 
before Congress frequently between the ratification of the Constitution in 1789 and the moment 
when Walsh wrote, and in the House of Representatives, at least, the men who ran the nation 
reacted with anything but indifference.  On several occasions, the topics of slavery and the slave 
trade sparked heated debate in the House of Representatives.  Three such occasions took place in 
                                                           	 1 Robert Walsh, An Appeal from the Judgments of Great Britain Respecting the United States of America 
(Philadelphia: Mitchell, Ames, and White, 1819), 307. 
 2 Walsh, An Appeal, 308. 
 3 Walsh, An Appeal, 309. 
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1790, 1804, and 1819-1820.  In 1790, three antislavery memorials led to disagreements 
regarding the extent to which Congress was permitted to discuss the subjects of the slave trade 
and, more particularly, slavery, and the powers Congress possessed over these matters.  In 1804, 
the question was one of the expediency of taxing the transatlantic slave trade as the Constitution 
permitted.  A decade-and-a-half later, Congress exploded over a proposed restriction to 
Missouri’s admission to the Union as a state, a restriction that would lead to the end of slavery in 
Missouri. 
 Individually, these three debates provide snapshots that illustrate the nation’s relationship 
with slavery at particular moments.  They provide brief insights into the ways in which the 
general government addressed slavery and the slave trade and how slavery shaped divisions 
within the nation.  On the surface, these debates perhaps appear to have little in common besides 
a general focus on the topics of slavery and the slave trade.  On all three occasions, however, 
members of the House of Representatives addressed the idea that slavery was a “blot in the 
national character of America,” using it to inform and shape their debates and to support 
antislavery causes in Congress.   Placing these debates side by side, examining the “snapshots” 
in a chronological succession, illustrates a long-lasting concern in Congress for the United 
States’ standing among its fellow nations of the Atlantic world and the ways in which slavery 
impacted that standing.  Examining the debates in 1790, 1804, and 1819 and 1820 together 
addresses the question of how members of the House of Representatives in the early republic 
used a concern for the national character, or the nation’s reputation, to shape and define the 
relationship between slavery and the general government and to make a case for general 
government support for antislavery causes during that period. 
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 First and foremost, by invoking concern for the national character to support their 
arguments, representatives in Congress—particularly those opposed to slavery’s expansion—
were able to create space to discuss slavery and the transatlantic slave trade as national issues.  
Those who supported general government’s power to regulate the slave trade and slavery used 
slavery’s impact on the national character to counter the arguments from slaveholders—
primarily from the Lower South—and their allies that slavery and the slave trade were purely 
state matters over which the general government had no authority.  They also used the argument 
that slavery had a negative effect on the nation’s character to justify attempting to exert 
increasing amounts of government authority over the states to address the problem of slavery.  In 
1790, opponents of the slave trade or slavery used concern for the national character to support 
the rights of antislavery petitions to be received and considered in Congress, countering 
vehement proslavery arguments that slavery and the slave trade were issues that should be 
addressed entirely at the state level.  In 1804, members of the House invoked national character 
both to support and to oppose a proposed tax on imported slaves.  As in 1790, these 
representatives sought to counter arguments based on state sovereignty, but they went beyond the 
goal of merely creating a space for slavery as a national issue, using concern for the slave trade’s 
impact on the national character to advocate the general government’s authority to rebuke a state 
for involvement in the transatlantic slave trade.  In 1819 and 1820, antislavery representatives 
again used national character to justify contemplation of antislavery measures in Congress and to 
counter state rights arguments that made slavery no business of the general government.  This 
time, the goal was not censure of a state, but congressional control over slavery in an incoming 
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state.  During all three debates, concern for the national character linked together slavery and 
national interest every time a member of Congress chose to invoke it. 
 It should here be noted that the term “national character” can be understood in a variety 
of ways.  In common twentieth century social science usage, “national character” usually refers 
to the specific, defining characteristics of the people of a nation.    It is the set of characteristics 
shared by most of the people of a nation, ones that can be said to set someone apart as uniquely 
“American” or “British” or “Japanese,” and so on.    Morris Ginsberg, a leading British 
sociologist in the mid-twentieth century, also defined it as “the nature of the organization as 
embodied in its institutions, its collective achievements, and its public policy.”4  By this 
definition, national character is about national achievements and institutions, the things that set it 
apart in the world.  While this definition is in some ways similar to the way members of 
Congress in the early American republic would have used the term, definitions focused on 
unique characteristics do not fully address how these men would have understood or spoken of 
national character.   
 David Waldstreicher helps to bridge the divide between modern usage of the term and the 
way men of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries would have used it.  He describes 
“national character” as “a way of understanding the relationship between the citizen, or national 
subject, and the state, or national government.”5  He includes in his definition ideas of the “body 
politic” and of characteristics of the nation and its people.  In late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century America, it allowed individuals to be understood in the context of their national culture 
                                                           
 4 Morris Ginsberg, quoted in Otto Klineberg, “A Science of National Character,” American Scientist 32, 
No. 4 (October 1944): 274. 
 5 David Waldstreicher, In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism, 1776-1820 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 141. 
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even as they shared in the formation of that culture.  The idea of the national character, for 
Waldstreicher, also comprehends within it the idea of an anthropomorphic state with “a 
reputation in the world,” and it is this concept that applies most directly to the congressional 
debates about the slave trade and slavery from 1789 to 1820.6  
 For many members of Congress, the nation, just like a gentleman of the period, possessed 
a claim to a character or reputation.  For gentlemen, a good character—his “good name”—
depended on his public virtue.  This was character in the sense of “moral excellence and 
firmness.”  Gentlemen were expected to conduct themselves in a morally upstanding manner, 
setting an example to their peers and the general public.  In the same way, a nation could be 
judged by its conduct.  Robert Walsh wrote his Appeal with the goal of arresting and, if possible, 
completely ending “the war which is waged [by the British] without stint or intermission, upon 
our national reputation.”7  The idea of the national character, for the men in Congress, just as for 
other concerned citizens, was centered on foreign perceptions of the United States as a nation.  If 
the United States conducted itself in a manner consistent with its avowed republican principles—
if it upheld its commitment to liberty and equality as outlined in the Declaration of 
Independence, this reflected well on the national character.  If, however, it behaved 
inconsistently or in a way other nations, particularly those of Europe, perceived as less than 
upstanding—by participating in the transatlantic slave trade, for example—this negatively 
impacted the national reputation, or the national character. 
 It is for this reason that so many congressmen in the early republic expressed concern 
about the national character, or the nation’s reputation among foreign nations, particularly 
                                                           
 6 Ibid. 
 7 Walsh, An Appeal, vi. 
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European nations such as Britain, in regards to American participation in the transatlantic slave 
trade and the growing institution of slavery in the nation—they were perceived as less than 
virtuous and were, foreign detractors accused, inconsistent with the nation’s founding principles.  
Appealing to a concern for the national character during congressional debates about slavery 
helped to establish slavery and the transatlantic slave trade as national issues over which the 
general government rightfully held some power.  It combated the notion that slavery and the 
slave trade were purely matters for the individual states and legitimized the slave trade and 
slavery as national concerns that should be addressed in national politics. 
 Over the last few two or three decades, several historians have addressed this issue of the 
role of slavery in the politics of the early American republic, though it was largely an unexplored 
field prior to 2000.8  During the 2000s, however, this subject has received more attention, with 
the historians pursuing questions relating to the topic falling more or less into two groups.  The 
first, and most popular, deals specifically with the role of slavery in the Constitution.  Historians 
such as David Waldstreicher and George William Van Cleve have argued recently that the 
Constitution was not neutral on the issue of slavery, but was in fact a proslavery document.  In 
Slavery’s Constitution, Waldstreicher indicates the portions of the Constitution that directly 
impacted slavery, as well as several sections with a less direct impact, to demonstrate the 
Constitution’s role in upholding and perpetuating the institution.  Van Cleve, in A Slaveholders’ 
Union, argues still more adamantly that the Constitution was a proslavery document.  He also 
claims that the Revolution, far from weakening slavery, as most people believe, left it stronger 
                                                           
 8 The only major work in this field prior to 2000 is Donald L. Robinson, Slavery in the Structure of 
American Politics, 1765-1820 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970)., which focuses primarily on the 
Founders and their decision to do nothing about slavery following the American Revolution. 
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than ever.  It did this by weakening the central government in America, transferring more power 
to slaveholders.9   
 Sean Wilentz argues against this view that the Constitution supported slavery.  In No 
Property in Man, he uses a careful analysis of the Constitution and the debates at the 
Constitutional Convention to show that, while the Constitution did not denounce slavery, the 
situation is considerably more complicated than the simple claim that the Constitution was 
proslavery.  He contends that the careful omission of any recognition of “property in man” in the 
Constitution resulted in a document that did not legitimize the institution of slavery, though it did 
not actively oppose it, either.  Wilentz traces debates concerning the relationship between slavery 
and the Constitution between its inception and the outbreak of the Civil War, concluding that 
“despite all the ways the Constitution reinforced human bondage and thwarted its abolition, [the 
exclusion of acknowledgement of property in man] would help inspire and legitimize the politics 
that...brought slavery to its knees.”10  
 Even while this debate over slavery and the Constitution remains ongoing, several other 
historians have turned their attention to slavery in early republic politics more generally.  Don 
Fehrenbacher, in The Slaveholding Republic, explores the relationship between slavery and the 
national government from the founding of the United States through the Civil War.  He discusses 
slavery’s impact on several aspects of national government, with particular attention to the 
powers Congress specifically held over slavery.  Fehrenbacher argues that during the period he 
                                                           
 9 David Waldstreicher, Slavery’s Constitution: From Revolution to Ratification (New York: Hill and Wang, 
2009); George William Van Cleve,  A Slaveholders’ Union: Slavery, Politics, and the Constitution in the Early 
American Republic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010); see also Leonard L. Richards, The Slave Power: 
The Free North and Southern Domination, 1780-1860 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 2000)and Paul 
Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders: Race and Liberty in the Age of Jefferson (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996) 
for further examples of works that present the Constitution as a proslavery document. 
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discusses, while the general government’s powers regarding slavery were limited by the 
Constitution, the way people interpreted the intent of those constitutional limitations was in turn 
shaped by the general government’s actions pertaining to slavery.  His goal in this work is to tell 
a complete story of the general government’s relations with slavery, looking at specific policies 
over time as measurements of that relationship.11 
 In Slavery and Politics in the Early American Republic, Matthew Mason more 
specifically demonstrates the role slavery played in national politics from the ratification of the 
Constitution through the Missouri Compromise, with particular attention to the period following 
the ban of the transatlantic slave trade in 1808.  He shows that even when Congress was not 
talking specifically about slavery, the rhetoric of slavery permeated congressional debates, 
making slavery a central issue in early republic politics even when it was not explicitly the topic 
under discussion.  For Mason, slavery played a key role in shaping the sectional division 
between North and South and was a central part of the dialogue of partisan politics.  The War of 
1812 marks a turning point in Mason’s narrative, as it intensified divisions over slavery in the 
nation.  The Missouri Crisis, far from being the fire bell in the night that Thomas Jefferson had 
labeled it, was a bitter political conflict that had been several years in the making.12 
 John Craig Hammond also carefully examines the role of slavery in American politics 
during this period, but with a rather different focus from Mason’s.  In Slavery, Freedom, and 
Expansion in the Early American West, Hammond challenges the traditional North-South 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
 10 Sean Wilentz,  No Property in Man: Slavery and Antislavery at the Nation’s Founding (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2018).  See 268 for quote. 	 11	Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic: An Account of the United States Government’s 
Relations to Slavery (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).	
 12 Matthew Mason, Slavery and Politics in the Early American Republic (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2006). 
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sectional division framework most historians take for granted, insisting that in this early period, 
the more important sectional division was between the East and the West, and slavery played a 
crucial role in this division.  Slavery gave the West a disproportionate power over the East, a 
situation that persisted in every discussion of slavery in the American territories through the 
1810s.  Every U.S. territory from the old western states of Ohio and Mississippi to the territories 
west of the Mississippi River grappled with the issue of slavery, even those where slavery was 
restricted by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.  Every newly organized territory and state 
contended with the issue of slavery, with large portions of every state insisting on the right to 
hold slaves.13  As a result, these new states used the issue of slavery to shape national policy in 
the West.  The Missouri Crisis, taking place at a time when the national government had begun 
to solidify its power over the West, made what had largely been a sectional issue restricted to the 
West a national issue that polarized North and South.14 
 Other historians of slavery and politics in the early republic have focused on topics such 
as the antislavery movement, the development and shaping of political parties, increasing 
sectional tension, particular individuals’ views on and interactions with slavery, and the use of 
slavery in political dialogue.15  Historians of slavery during this period, however, have focused 
                                                           	 13 Even Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois—territories where slavery had been excluded by the Northwest 
Ordinance—were home to proslavery factions that made strong cases for permitting slavery in each of these places. 
 14 John Craig Hammond, Slavery, Freedom, and Expansion in the Early American West (Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia Press, 2007). 
 15 Examples include Padraig Riley, Slavery and the Democratic Conscience: Political Life in Jeffersonian 
America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016); David F. Ericson, Slavery in the American 
Republic: Developing the Federal Government, 1791-1861 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2011); 
Richard S. Newman, “Prelude to the Gag Rule: Southern Reaction to Antislavery Petitions in the First Federal 
Congress,”  Journal of the Early Republic 16 (Winter 1996): 571-599; Nicolas Wood, “John Randolph and the 
Politics of Slavery in the Early Republic,” Virginia Magazine of History and Biography (Vol. 120, No. 2, Summer 
2012): 106-143; Rachel Hope Cleves, “‘Hurtful to the State’: The Political Morality of Federalist Antislavery,” 
Robert G. Parkinson, “‘Manifest Signs of Passion’: The First Federal Congress, Antislavery, and Legacies of the 
Revolutionary War,” and Brian Schoen, “Positive Goods and Necessary Evils: Commerce, Security, and Slavery in 
the Lower South, 1787-1837” in Contesting Slavery: The Politics of Bondage and Freedom in the New American 
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substantially less on the ways in which Americans’ concerns about foreign perceptions of their 
nation shaped the general government’s relationship with slavery.  At a time when abolition was 
a transnational cause in the Atlantic world, it only makes sense that foreign influences would 
have an impact on political antislavery efforts at all levels of government.16  However, little has 
been written on this topic, and most of what is written is focused on later British efforts to 
entirely end the slave trade in the Atlantic.17   Several historians have highlighted events and 
ideas that affected the role of slavery in politics and influenced the general government’s 
approach to slavery.  Focusing on Americans’ perceptions of their nation’s place in the world 
and the impact of the perception of foreign judgments regarding the general government’s 
involvement with slavery and the slave trade provides additional insight to the relationship 
between slavery and the general government.  Highlighting antislavery and anti-slave trade 
congressmen’s use of national character to support their cause helps to counter the argument that 
the Constitution was inherently proslavery and that the general government was predominantly a 
proslavery institution.  It also provides scholars with a clearer understanding of how the 
antislavery cause gained an acknowledged, legitimate following in Congress in the years prior to 
the Missouri Crisis.  In a period when several argue the only major national antislavery success 
was the close of the transatlantic slave trade in 1808 and southern slaveholders shaped the nation 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Nation, eds. John Craig Hammond and Matthew Mason (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2011). 
 16 See J.R. Oldfield, Transatlantic Abolitionism in the Age of Revolution: An International History of Anti-
slavery, c. 1787-1820 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2013) for a detailed overview of Atlantic 
abolitionist networks.  For other works that treat on this subject, see Seymour Drescher, Abolition: A History of 
Slavery and Antislavery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Robin Blackburn, The American 
Crucible: Slavery, Emancipation and Human Rights (London: Verso, 2011); David Brion Davis, The Problem of 
Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770-1823 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1975). 
 17 Matthew Mason has written a couple of articles that deal, to some degree with this subject, but they are 
focused almost exclusively on the abolition of slavery in the Atlantic, and they focus primarily on a later period than 
this project.  See Mason, “The Battle of the Slaveholding Liberators: Great Britain, the United States, and Slavery in 
the Early Nineteenth Century.”  William and Mary Quarterly 3rd Series, LIX, No. 3 (July 2002): 665-696, and 
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into one friendly to slavery, it can be difficult to understand how Congress was able to entertain 
any antislavery motions.  Understanding early representatives’ preoccupation with the national 
character helps to explain how antislavery causes gained any traction in Congress.  
 The congressional debates in 1790, 1804, and 1819-1820 show that, for many 
congressmen, the general government’s approach to slavery played a significant role in 
establishing and maintaining the national character.  The debates also highlight the role that 
concern for the national character had in the general government’s approach to the issues of the 
slave trade and slavery.  Members of Congress expressed their conviction during these debates 
that the eyes of the world—particularly those of Europe—were upon them and upon their nation, 
and the European nations would judge the United States by the way Congress addressed an issue 
that a large portion of the Atlantic world regarded as a moral evil.   
 In 1790, the antislavery memorials from Pennsylvania and New York were the first of 
their kind to come before Congress since the ratification of the Constitution.  This was the first 
time the new general government was confronted with the issues of the transatlantic slave trade 
and slavery.  The men in the House of Representatives were well aware that they would set the 
precedent for how the House would deal with such issues in the future.  While concern for the 
national character formed only a small part of the debates in 1790, that concern helped to 
sanction the discussion of slavery and the slave trade as national issues. 
 National character represented a much greater portion of the 1804 debate over taxation of 
the transatlantic slave trade, which had recently been reopened in South Carolina.  Indeed, 
concern for the national character became a central point in the arguments of both representatives 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
“Keeping Up Appearances: The International Politics of Slave Trade Abolition in the Nineteenth-Century Atlantic 
World.”  William and Mary Quarterly 3rd Series, LXVI, No. 4 (October 2009): 809-832. 
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who favored the proposed tax and some who opposed it.  During this debate, the issue of taxing 
the slave trade split the House into three groups.  Just as in 1790, a group of representatives from 
the Lower South opposed the tax on state rights grounds, arguing that South Carolina, as a 
sovereign state, had the right to reopen the trade without interference from the general 
government.  The other two groups split over the meaning of the proposed tax; those who 
supported it claimed it would benefit the national character, while those who opposed it insisted 
it would be to the detriment of the national character.  Though these groups disagreed over the 
tax’s meaning, they shared the goal of expressing congressional disapproval of the slave trade 
and of South Carolina’s actions.  By making the national character a central part of their 
arguments, they again established the general government’s interest in the slave trade and used 
slavery’s impact on foreign perceptions of the nation to express the general government’s 
disapproval of an individual state’s actions. 
 Several men who supported restricting slavery in Missouri, however, invoked concern for 
the national character in an attempt to counter the adamant state rights arguments of their 
opposition.  These representatives, all of whom came from northern, non-slaveholding states, 
used the national character to argue that the nation as a whole still had a stake in slavery and that 
Congress had both a right and a responsibility to check the growth of slavery wherever possible 
and constitutionally permissible.  This was again a step further than many members of the House 
had gone in 1804, for during the debates over Missouri’s entry into the Union, those who 
incorporated a concern for the national character into their arguments used it to attempt to 
establish general government control over slavery in an incoming state. 
 
13 
 While in all three debates, the antislavery ideas and measures proposed were ultimately 
unsuccessful, representatives’ expressed concerns for the national character of the United States 
helped to establish the transatlantic slave trade and slavery as issues of national importance, ones 
that by right should receive the attention and fall under the authority of the general government.  
The idea that other nations were watching the United States’ actions in regards to slavery and the 
slave trade helped to sanction congressional discussion of antislavery measures.  Concern for the 
national character created a space in the United States House of Representatives for antislavery 
discussion and helped representatives to make a case for increasing government control over 
slavery and the slave trade, countering the contention that slavery and the slave trade were issues 
purely for the individual states. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
“THE INTEREST AND HONOR OF THE COMMUNITY”: ESTABLISHING SLAVERY AS 
A NATIONAL ISSUE IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1790 
 
 In February 1790, three antislavery memorials came to Congress from Quaker Yearly 
Meetings in Pennsylvania and New York and from the Pennsylvania Abolition Society (PAS). 
All three memorials drew Congress’s attention to the transatlantic slave trade and asked for the 
trade’s end.  The memorials from the Quakers’ yearly meetings presented their arguments largely 
in religious and moral terms, asserting that “both the true temporal interest of nations, and eternal 
well being of individuals depend on doing justly, loving mercy, and walking humbly before 
God,” and tying the fate of the slave trade to this ideal.  The memorial from the PAS, while 
articulating the same moral stance as the memorials from the yearly meetings, also drew heavily 
upon ideals from the Revolution and the Constitution to support the society’s antislavery 
position.  It invoked the specific wording of the preamble to the Constitution that made 
promoting the general welfare and securing the blessings of liberty a national priority, as well as 
the ideas in the Declaration of Independence that “mankind are all formed by the same Almighty 
Being,..equally designed for the enjoyment of happiness.,” and that “equal liberty was originally 
the portion, and is still the birth-right of all men.”  On these matters, the memorial asserted, both 
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Christianity and “the political creed of Americans” agreed.18  All three memorials asked 
Congress to uphold the cause of liberty and “step to the very verge” of their power to take action 
against the slave trade.19 
 The Senate quickly tabled the memorials without further discussion, effectively signaling 
their stance that the objects of the memorials were not a fit topic for discussion.  The House was, 
at the time, preoccupied with discussion of Hamilton’s plan for public credit, which would have 
made it unsurprising if the memorials met the same fate there.20  In the House, however, the 
memorials met with a different reception.  Although representatives from the Lower South states 
of South Carolina and Georgia, men such as Aedanus Burke, William Smith, and Abraham 
Baldwin, attempted to have the petitions tabled as they had been in the Senate, the memorials 
generated considerable debate.  Responding to the petitioners’ attempts to establish antislavery 
as a national cause, representatives from the Lower South emphasized at every opportunity their 
belief that the memorials dealt with topics on which Congress had no authority.  In opposition to 
this lower southern stance, several representatives from Virginia and northward expressed their 
opinion that the memorials raised issues of national interest.  To these advocates of further 
consideration of the memorials, the memorials deserved the attention of the House because 
slavery and the slave trade impacted the national interest and the national honor and character.   
 1790 was not the first time an antislavery petition came before the United States general 
government for consideration.  In 1783, the Quakers of the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting had sent 
                                                           
 18 Annals of Congress, 1st Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives, 1239. 
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to the Confederation Congress a petition to end the transatlantic slave trade.  At that time, the 
general government informed the Quakers that it had no power in this matter, as the slave trade 
and slavery were state issues.  For the rest of the 1780s, the Philadelphia Quakers and several 
other antislavery organizations pursued an aggressive antislavery campaign, focusing first on the 
transatlantic slave trade, then on emancipation.  They achieved a fair amount of success in the 
northern states as individual states banned the foreign slave trade and began emancipating the 
slaves within their borders, either immediately or more gradually.21 In fact, by the time the 
Constitution went into effect in 1789, only three states—North Carolina, South Carolina, and 
Georgia—still permitted slave importation.22  Following the restructuring of the national 
government initiated by the ratification of the Constitution, the Quakers decided to try again to 
gain support from the general government to close the transatlantic slave trade completely.23  
 The memorial from the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of Quakers was filled with religious 
language and generally espoused antislavery as a moral position.  In it, the petitioners expressed 
their firm belief “that unfeigned righteousness in public as well as private stations, is the only 
sure ground of hope for Divine blessing.”  It was not enough, according to this logic, to oppose 
slavery or the slave trade in private; one must be willing to take a public stance.  For this reason, 
the petitioners characterized the transatlantic slave trade as a “gross national iniquity” and asked 
Congress to make the effort “to the full extent of your power, to remove every obstruction to 
                                                           
 21 Several works directly address gradual emancipation in the northern states.  For examples, see Joanne 
Pope Melish, Disowning Slavery: Gradual Emancipation and “Race” in New England, 1780-1860 (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1998); Gary B. Nash and Jean R. Soderlund, Freedom by Degrees: Emancipation in 
Pennsylvania and Its Aftermath (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); David N. Gellman, Emancipating New 
York: The Politics of Slavery and Freedom, 1777-1827 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006). 
 
 22 Stephen J. Goldfarb, “An Inquiry into the Politics of the Prohibition of the International Slave Trade,” 
Agricultural History 68, No. 2, Eli Whitney’s Cotton Gin 1793-1993, A Symposium (Spring 1994): 27. 
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public righteousness.”  To make this request was the petitioners’ religious duty, they said.  They 
trusted that, if the members of Congress would but commit themselves to acting with justice and 
mercy, the slave trade would be abolished.24 
 The Philadelphia Yearly Meeting’s memorial, shown to members of the New York 
Yearly meeting prior to its presentation in Congress, prompted a similar effort from the New 
York Quakers.  Rather than focusing on general antislavery and religious principles, however, 
the memorial from the New York Yearly Meeting focused on the specific problem of traders 
who were exploiting a legal loophole in New York to prepare their ships for the transatlantic 
slave trade in New York harbors because their home states forbade such activity.  The Quakers 
in New York had previously petitioned their state government to put an end to this practice, 
which they saw as violating the spirit, if not the letter, of the traders’ states’ anti-slave trade laws.  
The New York legislature had informed the Quakers that it could do nothing about the situation, 
as it was the task of the general government, not the state, to address commercial matters of this 
nature.  Accordingly, the New York Yearly Meeting petitioned the general government about the 
issue in a memorial accompanying that of the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting, asking “that 
effectual provision may be made to restrain vessells from fitting and clearing out in any of the 
ports in this State for the purpose of a trade to Africa for slaves.”25 
 The PAS, whose membership consisted primarily of Quakers, sent a memorial to 
Congress that was less religious and more patriotic in tone.  The PAS memorial expressed great 
satisfaction that Congress had been vested by the Constitution with power for “promoting the 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
 23 William C. diGiacomantonio, “’For the Gratification of a Volunteering Society’: Antislavery and 
Pressure Group Politics in the First Federal Congress,” Journal of the Early Republic 15 (Summer 1995): 169-197. 
 24 Annals, 1st Congress, 2nd Session, 1224-1225. 
 25 DHFFC, Vol. 8, 323-324. 
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Welfare & securing the blessings of liberty to the People of the United States.”  It also stated the 
PAS members’ “expectation, that nothing, which can be done for the relief” of those in bondage 
“will be either omitted or delayed.”  The PAS memorial went considerably beyond denunciation 
of the transatlantic slave trade, asking Congress to act to the fullest extent of its power against 
slavery itself, and it did so in a manner that sought to tie antislavery to the principles of the 
American Revolution.  The petitioners asserted their absolute belief that liberty was the birthright 
of all men.  They reminded Congress that the enslaved were the only ones “in this land of 
freedom [who] are degraded into perpetual bondage, and who, amidst the general joy of 
surrounding freemen, are groaning in servile insurrection.”  The United States was a self-
proclaimed free nation, yet the general government did nothing about the thousands of enslaved 
people within the nation’s borders.  This went a step beyond asking for the amelioration of the 
slave trade, as the Quaker memorials had done; the PAS memorial asked Congress to consider 
action against slavery itself.  In the memorial’s close, the PAS made a further effort to connect 
the issue of slavery to the wellbeing and standing of the nation, asking Congress to “devise 
means for removing this Inconsistency from the Character of the American People” and to “Step 
to the very verge of the Powers” the legislature possessed “for discouraging every Species of 
Traffick in the Persons of our fellow Men.”  According to the PAS memorial, slavery was not 
just a matter of morals or a religious concern, though the memorial addressed these elements, but 
a matter of the national character.  It was, in the eyes of the authors of the memorial, opposite 
“the true Principles of liberty” that ought to suffuse “this land of Freedom.”26  
                                                           
 26 Annals, 1st Congress, 2nd Session, 1239-1240; DHFFC, Vol. 8, 326.  For more on the membership of the 
PAS, see diGiacomantonio, ““’For the Gratification of a Volunteering Society.’” 
 
19 
 Representatives from the Lower South were quick to protest any consideration of the 
memorials or their objects.  For these men, Congress could not cease discussion of the subject of 
slavery too quickly.  They reacted to the antislavery requests of the memorials with an immediate 
attempt to convince their colleagues to table the memorials as the Senate had done, ending all 
discussion of the memorials and their antislavery goals.  Richard Newman writes of this attempt 
to suppress discussion, “The First Congress...witnessed the earliest attempted gag rule.”27  Lower 
Southern representatives had a couple of reasons to wish to avoid discussion of slavery and the 
slave trade in Congress.  First, they and their constituents had concerns about a strong centralized 
government’s potential impact upon slavery.  Unless they managed to establish early in the 
course of the new government the general government’s lack of power over slavery, they would 
face constant uncertainty about the perpetuity of slavery.  They favored a strong national 
government for many matters, but they generally “agreed that it must be rendered powerless 
against the institution of slavery.”28  Establishing a precedent of tabling antislavery memorials 
without discussion would be one effective way to keep power over slavery out of the hands of 
the general government. 
 Of all the states in the union in 1790, South Carolina and Georgia were by far the most 
reliant on slave labor.  The representatives from the two states freely acknowledged this, 
claiming that their states would fall to waste entirely without slaves to cultivate the land.29   In 
large part because of this vested interest in slavery and the slave trade, when the memorialists 
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attempted to make slavery and the slave trade national issues, the representatives from the Lower 
South responded with arguments that these issues rightfully belonged to the individual states, not 
the general government.  The Constitution reserved to the states all powers not expressly 
delegated to the general government, and power over slavery and the slave trade numbered 
among these powers.  Furthermore, as the part of the nation most heavily involved with the slave 
trade and slavery, the states of the Lower South, not the nation as a whole, had the best right to 
decide how to proceed, according to the representatives from the region.  Slavery and the slave 
trade, these representatives insisted, were state issues, not national ones. 
 Additionally, in many Lower Southerners’ opinions, slavery was no business of the 
Quakers and the members of the PAS, as they did not have any slaves and so could not have any 
vested interest in the institution of slavery.  Without a vested interest in the subject under 
consideration, representatives from the Lower South expressed doubts whether the Quakers were 
justified in petitioning the general government about it.  Ultimately, the representatives from the 
Lower South asserted that they considered slavery and the transatlantic slave trade questions of 
sectional interest; slavery was, they said, a sectional institution and therefore a sectional concern, 
not a national one.  The issues of the slave trade and slavery ought to be left to the individual 
states, particularly the states of the Lower South, who had the greatest interest in slavery.  It was 
against southern interest, these representatives argued, to do anything with the antislavery 
memorials except dismiss them.  Furthermore, what the memorials requested was in direct 
violation of the Constitution, the southern representatives contended, as the Constitution secured 
to them the right to import slaves at least until 1808 and gave Congress no explicit power over 
slavery, and little more over the slave trade. 
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Representative Aedanus Burke of South Carolina was one of the most vocal opponents of 
the memorials.  He lost no time in asserting that “the men in the galley come here to meddle in a 
business with which they have nothing to do; they were Volunteering it in the cause of others, 
who neither expected nor desired it.”  Several of the men involved with the crafting and signing 
of the memorials had come to Congress to lobby for their cause.30  To Burke, the memorialists’ 
and the lobbyists’ intent was to meddle where they were neither needed nor wanted.  Slavery and 
the slave trade were a matter of southern property rights, and depriving southerners of their 
property could not materially affect the petitioners, removed from the situation as they were.  
And if the House insisted on entertaining the antislavery memorials, it ought to wait for petitions 
with the opposite position to come before Congress so that the representatives could reasonably 
consider all sides of the issue.  To proceed as his opponents intended to do, Burke said, 
entertained a threat to southern property from people who would not feel the impact of the 
consequences.31   
Representative Thomas Tucker agreed with his fellow South Carolinian and advocated 
dismissing the memorials “without further notice.”  He stated, “Congress have no authority, 
under the constitution, to do more than lay a duty of ten dollars upon each person imported.”  
Furthermore, he believed, that duty would not have the effect the petitioners desired.  In fact, 
Tucker claimed, it might make the slaves’ treatment worse “because an interfered with the 
subject, may excite a great degree of restlessness in the minds of those it is intended to serve, and 
may be a cause for the masters to use more rigor toward them.”  In other words, he was 
concerned that any interference in slavery on the part of the national government might result in 
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slave insurrection.  This insurrection would result in consequences opposite those intended by 
the memorials, as it would lead to harsher treatment of the very slaves for whom the memorials 
expressed such concern.  It was better, therefore, to stay out of the business entirely rather than to 
risk making the slaves’ situations worse, particularly since the memorials desired more of 
Congress than Congress could constitutionally deliver.32  Tucker, unlike the Quakers, certainly 
had a material interest in the outcome of the debate.  While he was trained as a medical doctor, 
he had made his fortune as a plantation and slave owner.  As such, he had a strong personal 
interest in maintaining the states’ independence from the general government on the subject of 
slavery.  He also likely had firsthand knowledge of the fear of slave insurrection that haunted 
many slaveholders.33 
Representative Abraham Baldwin of Georgia expressed sorrow that the subject of slavery 
and the slave trade had come before Congress at all “because it was of a delicate nature, as 
respected some of the states.”  He asked the House to remember the Constitutional Convention, 
during which “the member from the southern states were so tender upon this point, that they had 
well nigh broken up without coming to any determination.”  Because of their dedication to 
union, Baldwin claimed, the southern delegates had compromised, “and the constitution 
jealously guarded what they agreed to.”  The Constitution specifically safeguarded the right to 
import slaves from Africa for a certain number of years.  To cut short this guaranteed span of 
time, or to take action against slavery in any way, Baldwin’s words suggested, would excite 
southern sentiments to the point of endangering the union.  Others in the House had argued that 
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the memorials did not specifically call for the abolition of the slave trade, therefore the 
representatives from the Lower South need not be alarmed.  To this Baldwin replied, “I think, sir, 
it prays for nothing else, and therefore we have no more to do with it, than if prayed to establish 
an order of nobility, or a national religion.”  Abolishing the slave trade was just as much against 
the Constitution, in Baldwin’s opinion, as either of the actions he mentioned.  He opposed 
committing the memorials because their objects were unconstitutional and would negatively 
impact the lower southern states.34 
In addition to their defense of states’ individual rights to determine their involvement 
with the slave trade, representatives from the Lower South also made it a point to vilify the 
Quakers sending the memorials, hoping to discredit the memorials’ objects by discrediting the 
memorials’ authors.  They sought to shift the focus of the debates from slavery and the character 
of the nation to the character of the people requesting general government interference in the 
slave trade.  The representatives strove to paint the Quakers as self-interested, traitorous religious 
fanatics, contradicting the Quakers’ portrayal of themselves as patriots concerned primarily for 
the national character and virtue.  They were quick to point out the Quakers’ role in the recent 
Revolution.  Pacifism was a part of the Quaker religion, which meant the Quakers had not fought 
with their fellow Americans against the British.  Furthermore, some representatives pointed out, 
many Quakers had supported the British, rather than the Americans.  No matter how active or 
passive the Quakers’ actions during the Revolution, lower southern representatives said, the 
Quakers had been traitors.  The Quakers’ appropriation of the Revolution’s ideals for the 
antislavery cause was, therefore, nothing short of utter hypocrisy.  Burke called the Quakers 
                                                           
 34 DHFFC, Vol. 12, 308-309. 
 
24 
“base” and “treacherous” and insinuated that, during the Revolution, the Quakers had worked for 
the enslavement of their own country.  Representative James Jackson of Georgia seconded 
Burke’s comments, reminding his colleagues in the House that Gordon’s history declared 
Quakers “enemies to our cause and constitution.”35 
  By attacking the Quakers as a group, the representatives from the Lower South and their 
allies hoped to break down the connection made in the memorials between slavery and the 
national character.  Attacks on the Quakers continued throughout the debates on the memorials, 
as these representatives attempted to undermine the petitioners’ claims to the ideological high 
ground that the slave trade negatively affected the nation. Jackson called the antislavery Quakers 
“evil spirits hovering over our heads in the gallery,” and Burke compared them to “Milton’s 
Lucifer, who entered Paradise in the shape of a cormorant.”36  Such debased figures, the Quakers 
could not be the heirs of the Revolution; they had not supported the Revolution to begin with and 
had no claim to its principles or to the virtue so valued by the leading men of the Revolution.  
These religious images also denied the Quakers their claim to any sort of moral high ground for 
antislavery. 
  Despite staunch opposition from the Lower South and lower southern representatives’ 
personal attacks on the Quaker petitioners, many representatives from the North and from the 
Upper South supported sending the memorials to a committee for further consideration.  Several 
expressed their general opposition to slavery and, more particularly, the transatlantic slave trade, 
but most based their support for further consideration of the memorials on a broader ideological 
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base.  They argued that American participation in the cruelties of the slave trade identified in the 
memorials did not reflect well on the United States in the eyes of other nations.  Several of the 
representatives who supported sending the memorials to committee also took hold of the PAS 
memorial’s comments about the ideals of the Revolution and the founding principles of the 
nation, connecting the ideals of the memorials with the ideals of the nation.37 
 Following the presentations of the various memorials to the House, Representative Roger 
Sherman of Connecticut moved that the memorials be referred to a special committee to 
determine just what the limit of Congress’s authority was in the matter.  The committee was to 
“consist of one member from each state, because several states had already made some 
regulations on this subject.”38  Including members from each state would presumably ensure 
each state’s interests were represented and bring greater cohesion to the way the slave trade and 
slavery were addressed in Congress.39   
 Sherman’s motion gained support from representatives from Virginia northward.  Of the 
representatives who did support sending the memorials to committee, several supported the 
motion for moral reasons; they believed the slave trade was cruel and wrong and that Congress 
ought to do all in its power to alleviate the suffering of those subjected to it.  This was also the 
point the memorial from the Pennsylvania Quakers had so strongly made.  Others, however, 
based their arguments for sending the memorials to committee on ideas that aligned more closely 
with the principles outlined in the memorial from the PAS: the slave trade went against the 
principles of the Revolution and negatively impacted the entire nation, making it a national issue. 
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 Representative Josiah Parker of Virginia was a slaveholder and generally opposed a 
strong centralized government.  However, he spoke in favor not only of sending the memorials to 
committee, but of the cause they promoted, as well.  To Parker, the issue of the slave trade was 
one of “momentous concern to the future prosperity and happiness of the people of America.”  
He considered it his duty “as a citizen of the union” to support the cause outlined in the 
memorials and to take action as far as the Constitution would allow.  As a slaveholder, Parker 
did not oppose slavery, though “it is not surprising that he became a spokesman against the 
further importation of slaves,” since in his home district it was economically and politically 
advantageous to oppose the slave trade in favor of developing the domestic slave trade.40  Still, 
even if he was motivated by self-interest, Parker viewed the transatlantic slave trade as a national 
issue meriting, or even requiring, national attention.  Though he never clarified just what he 
meant by calling himself a “citizen of the union,” the phrase suggests a contrast with a citizen of 
a particular state.  Parker, in this moment, demonstrated his commitment and attachment to a 
national agenda, at least as far as this matter was concerned.  The slave trade, he asserted, 
affected the happiness of the entire nation, not just those parts of the nation most invested in or 
reliant on the trade, and it was on behalf of the whole United States—“as a citizen of the 
union”—that he spoke in this moment.41 
 Representative Elias Boudinot of New Jersey likewise expressed his support for further 
consideration of the memorials in terms of the interest of the nation: “It is not because the 
petition comes from the society of Quakers that I am in favor of the commitment, but because it 
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comes from citizens of the United States, who are as equally concerned in the welfare and 
happiness of their country as others.”  Burke and a few of his colleagues had expressed their 
strong opinion that the memorials should receive no further consideration from Congress because 
the Quakers had no right to interfere with slavery when they were not slaveholders.  Boudinot 
refuted this, considering the antislavery petitions as expressions of concern for the state of the 
nation from citizens of the nation who had a right, as such, to be heard.  The recently passed 
constitutional amendments that comprised the Bill of Rights guaranteed to citizens of the United 
States the right of petition, and denying petitions without further consideration would set an 
undesirable precedent.  More than this, though, Boudinot was in no doubt that it would benefit 
the nation to put an end to the slave trade by any means possible, provided such an act was 
constitutional and in Congress’s power.  He did not advocate discussing the objects of the 
memorials before a committee had investigated them, and he certainly did not support doing 
anything beyond what the Constitution said might be done, but he saw the questions raised by 
the memorials as national ones “well worthy of our consideration.”42 
 Both Roger Sherman of Connecticut and James Madison of Virginia pointed to the 
situation outlined in the New York memorial to refute the lower southerners’ contention that 
only the states could address the issues of slavery and the slave trade.  According to Madison, 
“The petition...speaks of artifices used by self-interested persons to carry on this trade; and the 
petition from New-York states a case, that may require the consideration of congress.”  The New 
York Quakers had already appealed to their state government to put an end to the practice of 
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foreign ships outfitting for the African slave trade in New York harbors.  New York had already 
banned the slave trade, but a loophole in the law allowed others to prepare to set sail for Africa 
for the purpose of purchasing slaves to sell in the Americas.  When the Quakers complained of 
this to the New York government, though, the state government informed them that it was 
powerless in this matter.   The practice of the ships circumventing New York’s law against the 
African slave trade dealt with the regulation of commerce, which was a matter for the national 
government.  With this history in mind, Madison suggested that the situation the New York 
Quakers described might best be addressed by the national government.43   
 Sherman concurred with Madison’s opinion and suggested that “it would, therefore, be 
proper to commit that petition, in order to ascertain what were the powers of the general 
government, in the case doubted by the legislature of New-York.”  At the very least, sending the 
New York memorial to committee would give the House the opportunity to determine where the 
power the New York Quakers desired could be found.  The purpose of the committee was not, 
after all, to abolish the slave trade; it was merely to ascertain what power Congress had related to 
slavery and the slave trade.  This was the first time slavery had received much attention in 
Congress since the Constitution went into effect, and the general government was still striving to 
define its powers and limitations.  Both Madison and Sherman made a case for the general 
government’s involvement with slavery when they expressed the belief that the national 
government might be the only appropriate place to address some parts of the memorials.44   
 Slavery could be a matter of national concern because the Constitution made the general 
welfare a matter of national concern, and the memorials contended that slavery affected the 
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welfare and happiness of the nation as a whole.  The memorial from the Philadelphia Yearly 
Meeting asked Congress to “remove every obstruction to public righteousness,” clearly defining 
the slave trade as one such obstruction.  The New York memorial characterized the state’s 
specific situation as one “deeply interesting to the rights of men,” an issue to which the United 
States had ideologically committed itself during the Revolution.45   
 Despite lower southern efforts to brand those who sent the memorials as traitors and to 
disconnect revolutionary and republican principles from the antislavery cause, several of the 
memorials’ advocates drew upon these ideas when supporting sending the memorials to 
committee.  The strongest arguments in favor of further consideration of the memorials did not 
come purely from invocations of republican ideology, however.  Instead, the memorials’ 
supporters made their case by linking national interest to national honor and character.  
Revolutionary republican ideology was a part of this, but more of it had to do with the idea of 
national honor.  James Madison agreed that the issues raised by the memorials were of national 
concern.  He particularly focused on the New York memorial’s concerns about foreign ships 
fitting for the transatlantic slave trade in New York harbors, a problem that particularly might 
merit Congress’s consideration.  He stated, “If any thing is within the federal authority to restrain 
such violation of the rights of nations, and of mankind, as is supposed to be practised in some 
parts of the United States, it will certainly tend to the interest and honor of the community to 
attempt a remedy.”  The community to which Madison referred was the community of the 
nation.  He advocated further consideration of the objects of the petitions to promote the national 
interest and the national honor.  Congress need not go against the Constitution to act on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
 44 Ibid., 289. 
45 Ibid., 288; DHFFC, Vol. 8, 322-324. 
 
30 
memorials.  True, Congress was forbidden from abolishing the transatlantic slave trade at that 
time, but it was worth considering what Congress could do.  Madison offered as an example that 
Congress might pass some sort of regulation regarding the introduction of slavery to new states.  
The point was, though, that the memorials were about more than material interest.  What 
Congress could do Congress ought to do, as it would affect the nation’s honor, its character.46   
 Representative Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts claimed that “He thought nothing would 
excuse the general government for not exerting itself to prevent, as far as they constitutionally 
could, the evils resulting from such enormities as were alluded to by the petitioners; and the 
same considerations induced him to highly commend the part the society of Friends had taken it 
was the cause of humanity they had interested themselves in.”  According to Gerry, the national 
government had not just a right, but an obligation to address the issues presented by the 
memorials, so far as the Constitution allowed. Gerry personally had a complicated relationship 
with centralized government; he was one of three delegates to the Constitutional Convention 
who had left without signing the document because he objected to its lack of a declaration of 
rights.47  In this case, however, he showed no uncertainty about whether or not the slave trade 
was an appropriate issue for the general government’s discussion.  In fact, he claimed, this was a 
matter he hoped every nation would address, “to wipe off the indelible stain which the slave-
trade had brought upon all who were concerned in it.”48   
While these early articulations of concern about the national character were not as strong 
or as developed as they would later become, they accomplished several important objectives.  
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First, and most important, they made a convincing case that the slave trade and slavery were 
national issues, though they recognized that Congress had no power to abolish slavery in the 
states where it existed and was limited as to what it could do regarding the slave trade at that 
point.  While not every part of the United States had large numbers of slaves, and only a few 
states still participated in the transatlantic slave trade, the presence of slavery in the nation, and, 
more importantly in this debate, the participation of any part of the nation in the nefarious slave 
trade reflected poorly on the nation.  It went against the nation’s honor and diminished its 
standing in the international community. 
 After a couple of days of debate about committing the memorials, the House voted to 
refer the memorials to a special committee for further consideration and investigation.  The 
committee was to examine the requests made in the memorials and consider what Congress 
could do with respect to the petitions.  A few weeks later, the committee presented its findings in 
a report.  In the report, the committee affirmed that Congress was restrained from closing the 
transatlantic slave trade or “interfering with the emancipation of slaves” before the 
constitutionally stipulated year of 1808.  The report also asserted that Congress could regulate 
the slave trade, including providing for the humane treatment of slaves en route to the United 
States.  Congress could not “interfere in the internal regulation of States relative to the 
instruction of Slaves in the principles of Morality or Religion” or in slave treatment in any way, 
but it could tax the importation of slaves, and it could “prohibit Foreigners from fitting our 
Vessels in any port of the United states for the Slave trade.”  The committee assigned to report 
on the memorials acknowledged that Congress could do little regarding the memorialists’ 
requests, but the lower southern representatives were still displeased with the report, and this 
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time they had more allies, primarily from other slaveholding states.  The conclusion of the report 
stated that Congress would, as the memorials had requested, pursue the end of the transatlantic 
slave trade and slavery wherever it had authority to do so.49 
A couple weeks later, after the members of the House had time to look over the report, 
the House began discussing and debating it.  The debate that began on the sixteenth echoed many 
of the themes that had dominated the February debates. The representatives from the Lower 
South protested so much as talking about the subject, suggesting more than once that the House 
postpone its discussion of the report, perhaps indefinitely.   Those who stood against the Lower 
South made their case in terms of national interest and honor.  For a week, between March 16 
and March 23, the House, as a Committee of the Whole, debated every section of the report and 
the issues of slavery and the transatlantic slave trade, sometimes heatedly.  
What had changed, however, was the number of people who stood against the Lower 
South.  The right of the memorials to be heard and considered had been one thing; the report 
from the special committee was quite another.  The language of the report, rather ambiguous on 
many points, left open the possibility that Congress might attempt to emancipate slaves after 
1808, as well as potentially end the slave trade.  Representative Alexander White of Virginia, 
who had supported sending the memorials to the committee, “advised that the report be 
completely ‘struck out’...and replaced with just a few simple stipulations” limiting congressional 
power.50  
  Several representatives proposed amendments to the report, a number of which passed, 
resulting in a final report that looked little like the original.  Finally, on March 23, after a week of 
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heated debates and minimal progress, Madison moved “that the proceedings of the committee of 
the whole should be entered on the journals, as the best method for putting an end to the 
business,” as he considered it improper to pass the resolutions outlined in the report as abstract 
declarations.  Entering the proceedings in the journals would provide the public with 
information, show the general feelings of the House concerning the antislavery memorials, and 
suggest that Congress would exercise the powers it possessed as appropriate.   
 In response to this motion, congressmen who had been quiet in the debates prior to this 
point objected to entering the resolutions in the journals of the House.  Their objections focused 
on the lack of necessity of such an action and the desire that the resolutions be taken up by the 
House for consideration.  Others sided with these men for a variety of reasons.  William Smith of 
South Carolina, however, opposed both entering the reports on the House journal and further 
considering the resolutions of the report.  He particularly expressed concerns that the resolutions, 
both in their original and their revised versions, were to be entered along with the debates.  
Smith’s objection was that no indication of which resolutions had been approved and which 
rejected would be entered with them, and that the House would not vote upon Madison’s motion, 
yet the report would “be called an act of the House.”  In Smith’s opinion, the report would gain 
the weight of law without any opportunity for the members of Congress to pass or reject it.51 
 Madison disagreed with Smith’s objections, stating “it was in the power of any member 
to move, at any time, for a bill to the same effect.”  In other words, anyone who wanted to could 
call for a vote on it later.  Entering the proceedings in the journals seemed, to him, the “most 
conciliating and proper” way to resolve the issues that had been raised by the memorials and the 
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report.  He also acknowledged that it was “impossible to shut the door altogether against this 
business.”  There was no way to simply let the matter fall into obscurity or keep from addressing 
it in the future.  His motion seemed to him and to many of his supporters the best way to put the 
business to rest for the time being, while presenting the possibility of addressing it further in the 
future.  It would not give the report the weight of law, as Smith feared, but it would leave a 
record and leave open the possibility of revisiting the report at a later date.  A vote was taken, 
and Madison’s motion passed.52  Both the original report and the amended one were entered on 
the House journals. 
 During both the debates over sending the memorials to a select committee and the 
debates over the committee’s report, several congressmen expressed their support for the 
memorials and their objects in nationalist terms.  Just as the memorial from the PAS had, these 
men represented slavery as a blight on the national character.  Even as these representatives 
endeavored to show that slavery was a matter of national concern, representatives from South 
Carolina and Georgia repeatedly expressed their opinion that the national Congress should not be 
discussing slavery or the memorials because slavery was purely a sectional issue.  These same 
representatives gave long, impassioned speeches in defense of slavery as an institution and the 
necessity of the transatlantic slave trade to their states’ prosperity.  While arguments against 
Congress’s involvement in the objects of the memorials ultimately prevailed, those who 
forwarded nationalist arguments for considering the memorials laid the foundation for 
consideration of slavery as a national issue and set the precedent of entertaining antislavery 
materials in Congress. 
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 While one might argue that the representatives of the Lower South gained more ground 
over the course of the debates over the antislavery memorials—essentially, that the Lower South 
“won”—this interpretation overlooks the fact that the House set important precedents over the 
course of this debate.  Congress considered for the first time exactly what power and authority it 
possessed over slavery and the transatlantic slave trade, and while that authority amounted to 
very little, it had still received conscious attention in the House of Representatives.  Furthermore, 
those who claimed that slavery was by right a national issue had opened the door for the further 
discussion of slavery and the slave trade at the national level, a door that Madison had called 
impossible to shut.  They had asserted that the slave trade was a national problem and established 
Congress’s willingness to hear from the opponents of slavery.  Over the next several years, 
various antislavery groups sent petitions and memorials to Congress, and these were heard and 
considered, though the fact remained that not much could be done.  The most important 
achievement of the supporters of the right of the memorials to be heard was opening the door to 
further discussion of slavery and the slave trade. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
“EVERYTHING COMPARED WITH A GOOD NAME IS ‘TRASH’”: NATIONAL 
CHARACTER AND THE 1804 DEBATE ON TAXING THE TRANSATLANTIC SLAVE 
TRADE 
 
 In December 1803, the South Carolina legislature voted to end the state’s ban on the 
transatlantic slave trade, a ban that had been in place for more than a decade.53  South Carolina 
had historically had a complicated relationship with the slave trade.  During the Constitutional 
Convention, the delegates from South Carolina fought against efforts to close the trade on the 
national level, even threatening to leave the convention entirely.  It was largely due to the efforts 
of these men that the Constitution included the provision for a twenty-year protected window for 
the slave trade.  Somewhat ironically, South Carolina had suspended slave importation even 
before the new constitution went into effect.  At that time, in 1788, the decision was largely an 
economic one intended to stop the flow of specie out of the state.  In 1792, South Carolina 
briefly reopened the trade, but the racial violence of the Haitian Revolution led to a swift reversal 
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of that decision.  As late as 1802, the state legislature was nearly unanimous in its decision to 
keep the transatlantic slave trade closed.54 
 Clearly, the situation had changed by late 1803.  The reason a representative from South 
Carolina later gave for repealing its ban was that it had proven too difficult to enforce.  
Representative Thomas Lowndes stated that many had evaded the law, with the effect that the 
number of newly-imported slaves introduced into South Carolina over the previous few years 
had been little short of what it would have been without the ban.  This being the case, he said, “It 
appears to me to have been the duty of the Legislature to repeal the law, and remove from the 
eyes of the people the spectacle of its authority being daily violated.”55  Such rampant disregard 
of the law made it of little effect and undermined the state government’s authority.  In this light, 
Lowndes argued, it only made sense to repeal the ban.   
 Besides this declared reason, several other factors may help explain the state’s motives.  
Foremost among these is the acquisition of the Louisiana Purchase territory earlier that year.  To 
many South Carolinians, that largely unsettled land could not be cultivated without slave labor, 
and that labor had to come from somewhere.  Many believed that the newly acquired territory 
would quickly be overrun by slaves from the Caribbean, as it was a readily accessible source of 
slaves, and they feared that the rebellion and racial violence taking place in the Caribbean at that 
time would spread to the United States.  Slaves imported directly from African seemed far 
preferable to the possibility of rebellious slaves from other sources.  Other potential reasons for 
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the repeal include a desire to provide a legal alternative to the illegal trade of slaves from the 
Caribbean, and the rise of cotton as a cash crop in the state.56 
 Whatever the reason the members of the South Carolina legislature decided to repeal the 
state’s prohibition of the transatlantic slave trade, the other states of the Union met the decision 
with outrage and censure.  In the Hartford Courant, an article appeared that denounced the South 
Carolina legislature’s actions in rather inflammatory language, stating that “This abhorred traffic 
in human flesh calls for the severest reprehension of every government and every man who 
countenances or upholds it.”  The leaders in South Carolina, according to the author, were 
doubly culpable for this decision, as they purported to “be all on fire for the rights of man” and 
were “distinguished for their clamour about liberty and equality.”57  Even slaveholding states 
such as North Carolina, Tennessee, and Maryland passed resolutions urging a constitutional 
amendment that would allow the general government to end the slave trade before 1808.58   
 In January 1804, one short month after South Carolina repealed its ban on the 
transatlantic slave trade, David Bard brought the matter to the attention of the House of 
Representatives.  Bard, former frontier missionary and clergyman and a representative from 
Pennsylvania, rose to express his disapproval of South Carolina’s actions and to propose a 
resolution “that a tax of ten dollars be imposed upon every slave imported into the United 
States.”  He stated, “Had I been informed that some formidable foreign Power had invaded our 
country, I would not, I ought not, be more alarmed than on hearing that South Carolina had 
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repealed her law prohibiting the importation of slaves.”59  Other Americans shared his sentiment, 
and he invited the members of the House to join the states in expressing disapproval of South 
Carolina’s reopening of the trade.  Bard’s purpose in proposing the resolution was to 
demonstrate the general government’s disapprobation of South Carolina’s repeal.  Congress 
could not close the trade entirely, but the Constitution did permit that “a tax or duty may be 
imposed on such Importation, but not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.”  This tax, the 
highest the Constitution would allow, would show that Congress would do all within its power to 
act against the transatlantic slave trade and express disapproval of South Carolina’s decision to 
reopen that trade. 
 This was not the first time a congressman had proposed levying the constitutionally 
sanctioned tax; Representative Josiah Parker of Virginia had proposed a tax as early as 1789, but 
it had not passed.60  Though the idea was far from new, however, and the members of the House 
universally expressed their distaste for the slave trade, Bard’s proposal still sparked debate.  
Three major factions quickly emerged.  One sided with Bard, supporting the proposed tax and 
contending that it would show the general government’s disapproval of the transatlantic slave 
trade and South Carolina’s actions.  Another faction opposed the resolution on the grounds that 
South Carolina was within its rights as a sovereign state to repeal its ban, and that to tax the trade 
would be unfair to South Carolina.  The third faction also opposed the tax, but the reason the 
representatives gave for their opposition was that they disagreed over the probable effect of the 
tax.  They contended that the proposed tax, rather than discouraging the slave trade, would give 
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it official government sanction.  While the middle faction argued staunchly on state rights 
grounds, the groups who focused their arguments on the meaning of the tax connected that 
meaning to the national character.  Representatives from both groups agreed that the transatlantic 
slave trade reflected poorly on the United States as a nation, but they disagreed as to the probable 
effect of the proposed tax thereupon.   
 Bard’s resolution passed despite the opposition, and the members of the House were 
invited to present bills to implement the proposed tax.  Accordingly, Representative John 
Randoph of Virginia brought a bill before the House to tax the transatlantic slave trade.  At first 
glance, Randolph would seem an unlikely candidate to present such a bill.  He was well known 
during his own time and is still best known by historians today for pioneering proslavery 
political tactics in the early republic.  As historian Nicholas Wood points out, though, “Randolph 
was dedicated to the preservation of property rights and southern political power....But he also 
loathed slavery—especially slave trading—and supported federal action against slavery when it 
fell under clearly defined powers of the federal government.”61  The tax was clearly under the 
defined powers of the general government, and Randolph’s presentation of the bill speaks to his 
opposition to the slave trade and his belief that the tax could be effective against the trade.62 
 Upon the presentation of the bill, a representative from South Carolina moved that the 
bill be postponed.  Postponement was an established means in Congress of ending debate on an 
issue without a vote, and the representative freely acknowledged that his goal was “to get rid of it 
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altogether.”63  He pointed out that every member of the House who had spoken on the resolution 
had conceded that taxing the transatlantic slave trade would not reduce the number of enslaved 
people imported, so the tax would not accomplish what he believed was its purpose.  Others in 
the House supported postponement of the bill on the grounds that South Carolina reportedly 
intended to reinstate the ban on the slave trade soon.  They preferred to give the state the 
opportunity to end the trade without outside interference that could potentially bring about 
undesirable results.64 
 In the end, despite the efforts of Bard and his supporters, while the resolution passed, the 
House voted to postpone John Randolph’s bill to implement the tax on the African slave trade, 
effectively defeating the measure without actually voting against it.  Though the Constitution 
specifically allowed Congress to place a tax of ten dollars upon all slaves imported to the 
country, such a tax was never passed.  In 1804, the issue split the House into three groups or 
factions.  The representatives who argued against the tax on the grounds of state sovereignty and 
equality did so with similar motives to those of the Lower South representatives who had 
invoked state rights in the 1790 debates: they wanted Congress to drop the subject.  They were 
less militant about their agenda, and unlike in 1790, they offered no defense of slavery as an 
institution, but they moved multiple times to postpone the matter, which would effectively end 
discussion of it.  For those who favored the tax, invoking the national character followed the 
precedent antislavery forces in the House had set in 1790.  It also fit with the efforts throughout 
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the Atlantic at the time against the slave trade.65  For the third faction, however, the choice was 
decidedly less clear.  They opposed the proposed tax, but they did not wish to align themselves 
with the pro-state rights faction, as such a position did not, for them, express sufficient 
disapproval of South Carolina’s actions.  Using concern for the national character to oppose 
taxing the slave trade allowed them to speak and vote against the proposed tax without 
sacrificing future opportunities to address slavery and the slave trade as national issues.  It 
allowed them to oppose the tax while still expressing disapproval for South Carolina’s actions. 
 One of the most pressing issues in regards to the effects of the tax involved South 
Carolina’s rights as a state.  During the 1790 debates, over the antislavery memorials, 
representatives from the Lower South had contended heatedly that slavery and the transatlantic 
slave trade were matters for the states to decide for themselves individually, a stance that was 
largely upheld by both the report from the committee and Congress’s subsequent inaction on 
these issues.  After all, power over slavery was not given to the general government in the 
Constitution, and power over the slave trade was specifically denied the general government 
until 1808.  In the meantime, this meant the power was reserved to the states.  The same 
argument appeared in the debate over taxing the slave trade.  South Carolina, as a sovereign state 
with power over slavery and the slave trade, was well within its rights to repeal her prohibition 
on the trade, according to some representatives, no matter how repugnant people might find that 
decision.   
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 Speaker of the House Nathaniel Macon, a representative from North Carolina, expressed 
his concerns about the proposed measure in plain terms.  He restated the hope of advocates of the 
tax that it would show the hostility of Congress to the importation of slaves.  Macon found this 
objective somewhat problematic, however, as the effect of the tax seemed to him “an attempt in 
the General Government to correct a State for the undisputed exercise of its Constitutional 
power.”  No one argued that South Carolina did not have the right to decide whether or not to 
allow the importation of slaves from Africa, just as no one argued that the slave trade was a good 
thing.  For the general government to censure a sovereign state for an action within that state’s 
rights, though, stepped on those very rights.66 
 Representative Benjamin Huger, a slaveholder from South Carolina, agreed with Macon.  
He assured his listeners that, had he been in his state’s legislature—a position he had previously 
held—when South Carolina repealed the ban on the slave trade, he would have opposed that 
repeal.  As it was, though, he was in the national Congress as South Carolina’s representative, 
“and after the State had exercised their undoubted right, however he might dislike the measure, it 
was his duty to defend the right which they had to adopt it.”  He might not have agreed with his 
state’s decision, but Huger affirmed that it was the state’s decision to make.  For this reason, 
Huger could not agree to an act that would “censure [South Carolina] for doing that which she 
had an undisputed right to do.”67  Huger further pointed out that the “Eastern States” imported 
redemptioners from Germany without the national disapproval South Carolina experienced for 
the slave trade.  He asked his colleagues “from the Middle and Eastern States [to] recollect that 
the situation of South Carolina [was] very different from that of their States,” further showing 
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that in his mind, the issue was not one for the nation as a whole, but ought to be confined to the 
individual states or to the region most invested in slavery.  The eastern states were not totally 
faultless in their labor practices, so they should not condemn southern ones for the source of their 
labor.68  
 In addition to concerns about South Carolina’s sovereignty, some representatives also 
voice their concern that South Carolina would be unfairly affected by the proposed tax.  After all, 
South Carolina, as the only state that permitted slave importation at the time, would be the only 
state required to pay the tax.  For several representatives, this was closely linked with the 
peculiar needs of the slaveholding states.  No one was defending slavery or the slave trade, at 
least not in any positive terms, but neither was everyone fully denouncing the institution.  
Representative Thomas Lowndes of South Carolina, defending his state’s decision, claimed that 
his state only repealed its ban on the slave trade because it had proven unable to enforce the ban.  
Illegal slave importation was such a rampant problem that the law against it was virtually 
meaningless.  Lowndes suggested that this was the fault of the general government, which had 
not provided the help to which South Carolina was entitled by virtue of the fact that the state 
gave the revenue it received from foreign trade to the national government, which ought to 
entitle the state to help in this matter, which dealt with foreign trade.  Lowndes laid the blame for 
the illegal slave trade upon the national government and upon his “Eastern brethren,” who had 
continued the trade after it was banned.  In other words, South Carolina could not be held 
responsible for the decision to permit the transatlantic slave trade; without the support of the 
general government and other regions of the country, it could not stand against the trade on its 
own.  The repeal of the ban was not about slavery, Lowndes claimed, but about maintaining state 
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authority, for the rampant disregard for the state law against the slave trade had been counter to 
good order within the state.69 
 Representative Willis Alston of North Carolina supported Lowndes’s claim that a tax 
upon slave imports would be unfair to South Carolina.  He asserted his belief that the tax would 
unfairly burden South Carolina,; after all, “no State in the Union would be affected except South 
Carolina.”  Any time the House of Representatives considered laying a tax, he said, its members 
ought to make the effort to select objects for taxation that would affect the entire nation as 
equally as possible.  Taxing the transatlantic slave trade would clearly not affect all parts of the 
nation equally.  Alston further stated, rather pointedly, that “Those gentlemen who are not 
interested [slavery] ought to let us alone, and permit us to enjoy it as the necessity requires.”  For 
Alston, taxes should be fair, and slavery and all issues pertaining thereunto were best left to the 
states that were most concerned with them.70   
 The representatives from the Lower South who opposed the proposed tax made their case 
in terms of state sovereignty and equality between the states.  To counter them, those who 
supported the tax had to establish the transatlantic slave trade and South Carolina’s participation 
therein as a national matter requiring the attention of the national government.  A couple of 
representatives attempted to do this by attacking the claim that that tax singled out South 
Carolina.  Representative Ebenezer Elmer of New Jersey insisted that he “did not see that this 
measure had any pointed relation to South Carolina in particular.”71  In a similar vein, 
Representative John Lucas of Pennsylvania stated, “It cannot, I think, be justly said, by imposing 
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this tax we single out the State of South Carolina.”  He took the point further than Elmer had, 
though, asserting “If the tax shall operate more on South Carolina than on any other State, it will 
not be our fault....The remedy is in her hands; she can when she pleases prohibit the importation 
of slaves, and the tax, so far as it falls on her, will immediately cease.”72  In other words, the 
extent to which the proposed tax would affect South Carolina—or any other state—for that 
matter—was entirely up to South Carolina, according to Lucas.  The tax was a national one and 
would be equally in force in all parts of the nation. 
 More members of the House who supported taxing the transatlantic slave trade, however, 
used arguments based on a concern for the national character to nationalize the issue.  They 
insisted that South Carolina’s decision to reopen the slave trade tarnished the national reputation 
in the eyes of the world, which they did not hesitate to say were upon the United States.  
Representatives in this group argued that participation of any part of the nation in the 
transatlantic slave trade negatively impacted the character of the entire nation.  Placing a tax on 
that trade, they claimed, would show the nations of the Atlantic world that even though the South 
Carolina legislature had chosen to lift its ban on the trade, the general government did not  
 In his initial speech in defense of his resolution, Bard left no one in any doubt that he 
believed the world was watching the United States and judging the nation and the general 
government’s involvement with slavery and the transatlantic slave trade.  He unequivocally 
stated that the members of the House owed it “indispensably to ourselves and to the world, 
whose eyes are on our Government, to maintain its republican character.”73  The general 
government had a responsibility to conduct itself in a manner that demonstrated the nation’s 
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commitment to freedom from tyranny and oppression.  The national conduct should be above 
reproach if the nation was to maintain its character in the eyes of the nations of the Atlantic 
world.  Slavery and the slave trade stood in direct opposition to that goal.  Bard asked his fellow 
representatives, “Will foreigners concede this high character to us, when they...find that we hold 
a million of men in the most degraded slavery?”74  They would not, he said, but would instead 
see in the nation “the principles of tyranny.”75  This outcome was of all things most undesirable 
to Bard, as it was deeply detrimental to the national character.  It would take away the nation’s 
good name, and Bard believed that “Everything compared to a good name is ‘trash;’ and it rests 
with us whether we will preserve or destroy it.”76   
 That the United States might preserve and not destroy its good name was Bard’s goal in 
proposing the tax on the slave trade.  He told the members of the House that “if any of the States 
engage in the trade, the tax will have two effects—it will add something to the revenue, and it 
will show to the world that the General Government are opposed to slavery, and are willing to 
improve their power...for preventing it.”77  Implementing the full tax that the Constitution 
allowed would show the Atlantic world that the general government of the United States was 
acting against the slave trade to the extent of its abilities.  Bard considered this effect far more 
important than that of raising revenue, which he said was only an incidental effect of taxing the 
slave trade.  Discouraging the trade—and slavery by extension—was his chief goal.  Nearly one-
fifth of the population of the United States was enslaved, Bard pointed out, “a fact that must have 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
 73 Ibid., 994-995. 
 74 Ibid., 996. 
 75 Ibid. 
 76 Ibid., 995 
 77 Ibid., 994 
 
48 
the weight to sink our national character, in spite of volumes to support it.”78  The nation had a 
great deal in its favor and had a reputation abroad as well as at home as a land of liberty and “an 
asylum for the oppressed of all nations,” but the nation’s involvement with the slave trade 
threatened to destroy that.  Bard appealed to his fellow representatives’ pride in their nation, 
asserting “If...we hold a consistency of national character in any estimation, we will give every 
discouragement in our power to the importation of slaves.”79  This was what he meant the tax to 
do, to discourage the transatlantic slave trade and to uphold the national character. 
 Representative Samuel Mitchell of New York agreed that Bard’s proposed tax would 
discourage and show the general government’s disapproval of the slave trade.  Mitchell, who had 
been raised a Quaker, was perhaps the most outspoken opponent of slavery and the slave trade 
during this debate.80  Despite his statement at the beginning of his speech in support of the tax 
that “he would...say nothing on the immorality” of the slave trade or its “repugnance to...the 
spirit of our free Government,” he spent a significant portion of his time denouncing the 
conditions of the transatlantic slave trade.81  He also reminded his colleagues in the House that 
the enslaved posed a danger to the nation, pointing to the events on Saint Domingue as the 
ultimate example of what could happen if the slaves ever chose to rebel.  To Mitchell, slavery 
was “a dark spot on some of the members of the national body, which was spreading wider, 
turning black, and threatening gangrene all around.”82  He acknowledged that the general 
government could do nothing to end the slave trade or slavery at that moment; it could not do 
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anything to punish South Carolina for the decision to reopen the transatlantic slave trade, nor 
could it force the state to close the trade again.  Slavery was a part of the nation, “and Congress 
could not put an end to it.”  What Congress could do, however, was “interpose its authority, and 
discountenance [the slave trade] as far as possible” by passing the constitutionally permitted tax 
of ten dollars per person imported.83  This would show the general government’s disapproval of 
the slave trade, even if it could not yet end the nation’s participation in the trade altogether. 
 Like Mitchell, Representative Joseph Stanton, Jr., of Rhode Island was quite vocal in his 
opposition to slavery.  He related to the members of the House his recent experience witnessing 
“twenty or thirty negroes, chained to each other, and drove like mules to market,”84 hoping to 
arouse his fellow representatives’ sympathy for those in bondage.  The transatlantic slave trade, 
he asserted, “tarnishes the American character.”85  Stanton, like Mitchell, acknowledged that the 
general government could not prohibit the slave trade before 1808.  The government’s power 
was limited by the Constitution in this matter.  For this reason, “to lay a tax being the only 
Constitutional power the General Government possess,” he thought it best to exercise that 
power.86  Until 1808, this was the best way for the general government to discountenance the 
slave trade and work to remove the tarnish Stanton said afflicted the national character. 
 Where men like Bard, Mitchell, and Stanton were most concerned with laying out the 
proposed tax’s role in expressing the general government’s disapproval of the slave trade, 
Representative William Findley chose instead to directly address one of the major points of 
criticism of the tax.  Some representatives had expressed concern that the general government 
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would use money gained from the slave trade to build the nation.  In reply to concerns of this 
nature, Findley suggested that no one need see using the funds a tax on the slave trade would 
generate as shameful.  He suggested, “In laying the tax, we shall do all we can to discourage [the 
slave trade]; and if we do not like to see the money derived from taxing it in the common way. 
We may apply it to special objects”—to relieve the conditions of slavery, for example.87  Though 
the source of the funds may be objectionable, the funds themselves need not be viewed in a 
negative light.  Findley saw the tax as an opportunity to express disapproval of importing slaves, 
a subject on which all members of the House seemed united.  To him, this was the only 
constitutional remedy Congress had for the trade at present, and he thought it proper that they 
should use it.88 
 For Representative John Smilie of Pennsylvania, the revenue the tax would raise was a 
source of concern, as it was for some of the tax’s opponents.  In his opinion, though, the chief 
purpose of the tax was not revenue.  If he had thought otherwise, he would have objected, he 
said, “for he abhorred the idea of raising a revenue from a traffic in human beings.”89  More was 
at stake than money; Smilie “viewed the subject on a larger scale.  He considered its effect on 
national character.”90  Like Bard and Findley, he was confident that the tax would show the 
general government’s disapproval of the transatlantic slave trade.  While the proposed tax on the 
slave trade was, admittedly, small, even such a small tax would “show that it [the transatlantic 
slave trade] was a trade not approbated by the Legislature of the Union.”91  The members of the 
House of Representatives, Smilie said, had a responsibility to express their opinions on the 
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reopening of the slave trade, and this tax provided them with the opportunity.  With this in mind, 
he asked “whether it would be for the reputation of the nation to reject” the tax.92  The answer 
was a simple one for Smilie: the nation’s reputation—the national character—was best served by 
passing the tax. 
 Despite the arguments of Bard and several others who supported the proposed tax, a 
number of members of the House expressed concern that, far from the national character being 
best served by passing the tax, the case was precisely the opposite.  Lowndes had been the first to 
suggest that the proposed tax would sanction the transatlantic slave trade.  He stated, “Was I 
friendly to the trade, I should, without any hesitation, embrace the proposition contained in the 
resolution, and I should consider it a point gained of no small importance, that the Legislature of 
the General Government had given a sanction to it—for I can regard the Government deriving 
revenue from it in no other light than a sanction.”93  Friends of the slave trade would, by this 
reasoning, rejoice if Congress passed the tax.  While this point was secondary to Lowndes’s 
assertion that South Carolina was a sovereign state with the right to engage in the slave trade as it 
chose, other representatives quickly adopted the argument.  Some, like Lowndes, used the 
argument that the tax would sanction the slave trade to supplement their arguments about state 
rights.  A few, however, used this argument quite differently.  They argued that the proposed tax 
would show the general government’s approval of the slave trade to make the case that the tax 
would have a negative impact on the national character.  These men, who came from parts of the 
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United States ranging from New England to the Lower South, opposed the tax, but on nationalist, 
rather than on state rights grounds. 
 Representative George Bedinger of Kentucky stated that “if he could believe that the 
imposition of a tax of ten dollars upon every imported negro would check the importation, he 
would vote for it.”94  He believed, however, that a tax, particularly such a small one, would 
sanction the trade, and the revenue the tax brought would be too little to be of any worth in light 
of that apparent sanction.  Representative Andrew Gregg of Pennsylvania, one of the senior 
members of the House, agreed with Bedinger, claiming that placing a tax on imported slaves, no 
matter the actual goal of the measure, would be seen as approving the trade.  Initially, he said, 
when Bard had first introduced his resolution, he had been in favor of the measure.  After time 
and reflection, however, Gregg admitted that he had “very considerable doubts.”95  He believed 
the tax would not have the effect his colleagues claimed and might very well irritate South 
Carolina into keeping the slave trade open out of spite.  
  If the Constitution had permitted, Gregg said, he would vote in favor of a tax of one 
hundred or five hundred dollars per slave imported, as this would amount, more or less, to a 
prohibition of the trade.  As matters currently stood, however, he would prefer to see any other 
good taxed, “rather than stain our Treasury by filling it with money collected from a duty on 
imported slaves.”96  The initial purpose of the power to tax the slave trade was, Gregg believed, 
to provide a check to the trade.  At the time of the Constitutional Convention, Gregg reminded 
his fellow representatives, the price of slaves had been much lower, and a tax might have had the 
desired effect.  The situation had changed over the past decade and a half, though, and Gregg 
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asserted that the proposed tax could “neither prevent nor remedy the evil” of the slave trade.97  
For Gregg, the tax would not end the slave trade and would give the trade government approval, 
an outcome he certainly wanted to avoid.  The tax, far from showing disapproval of the trade, 
sanctioned it and tainted the national treasury, and for those reasons, Gregg would not support it.  
 Gregg was not the only one to express the sentiment that the treasury would be sullied by 
funds received from taxing the slave trade.  Representative Thomas Moore of South Carolina 
also stated his belief that money from such a tax would not be to the nation’s credit or benefit.  
He expressed his confidence that the House of Representatives would never “legalize an act by 
which our national coffers will be stained with the price of liberty.”98  Moore believed the tax 
would not discourage importation in the least and said he disapproved of any measure that drew 
revenue from the slave trade.  He did not suggest that Congress merely vote down Bard’s 
resolution.  If the members of the House wished to indicate the general government’s 
disapprobation of his state’s actions, he proposed a substitute resolution “That this House receive 
with painful sensibility information that one of the Southern States, by a repeal of certain 
prohibitory laws, have permitted a traffic unjust in its nature, and highly impolitic in free 
Governments.”99  The motion was out of order and so went nowhere, but it indicates that Moore 
was not opposed to the general government expressing disapproval of South Carolina’s actions 
or of the slave trade.  He simply did not believe that the proposed tax could accomplish the 
objective.100 
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 Representative Roger Griswold of Connecticut also expressed reservations about the 
message a tax on the slave trade would convey.  He claimed, “It will appear to the world that 
Congress are raising a revenue from a commerce in slaves.”101  It mattered to Griswold and, he 
assumed, his colleagues, what the world thought.  To raise revenue from such a source would 
discredit the United States in the eyes of other nations.  He did not like or approve of the slave 
trade, and he was confident that every representative in the House felt the same way.  For this 
reason, Griswold would not “consent to give it a legislative sanction.”102  He was in no doubt 
that taxing the transatlantic slave trade would “be viewed in that light be the people of this 
country and by the civilized world.”  Like Bard, he did not question that the eyes of the world, or 
at least of the nations of Europe, were upon the United States and would pass judgment on the 
nation based on the general government’s reaction to South Carolina’s repeal of its ban on the 
slave trade.  He simply disagreed as to the appropriate action to take. 
 Unique among the members of the House, Griswold was the only representative to 
express any doubts as to the constitutionality of the proposed tax.  Everyone else apparently 
agreed without question that it would be constitutional to impose the proposed ten-dollar tax on 
the slave trade, as the Constitution explicitly gave Congress the power to pass such a tax.  
Griswold contended that there were only two justifiable reasons for passing a tax: to discourage a 
particular trade and to collect revenue.  The Constitution forbade Congress to do anything to 
discourage the slave trade prior to 1808, he claimed.  In any case, he did not believe the proposed 
tax would discourage the trade.  As for revenue, he pointed out that Congress had not received a 
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report “that the Treasury is deficient in receipts.”  They had no pressing need for the money, 
Griswold said.  More importantly, though, revenue gained from such a source would be tainted.  
Furthermore, to pass the tax would recognize “a traffic in human flesh” as legitimate; it would 
sanction the transatlantic slave trade in the eyes of the nation and the world.103 
 Gregg, Moore, and Griswold all opposed taxing the transatlantic slave trade because they 
believed such a tax would show government approval or sanction for the trade.  Unlike most of 
the representatives from the Lower South who argued against the tax, they did not oppose it on 
the grounds of state sovereignty; that South Carolina had the right, as a sovereign state, to decide 
for itself whether or not to repeal its ban on the slave trade did not enter into their speeches at all, 
though even several of those who supported the tax acknowledged this right.104  They instead 
focused almost entirely on the meaning of the proposed tax for the nation.  This focus helped to 
shift attention away from state rights and avoided aligning opposition to the tax with a strictly 
state rights agenda.  It also reflected their desire to express the general government’s disapproval 
of South Carolina’s repeal without supporting the tax. 
 By focusing on the meaning of the tax, these representatives met the tax’s supporters on 
their own grounds.  They made the issue a national one by discussing the tax’s impact on the 
national character.  Those who supported the tax said the eyes of the world were upon them.  
These men agreed; the nations of the Atlantic world were watching the United States.  What the 
general government decided to do about South Carolina’s repeal of the ban on the slave trade 
would impact the nation’s international reputation.  For Gregg, Moore, Griswold, and the 
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members of Congress who agreed with them, opposing the proposed tax was the best way to 
uphold that reputation.  By so arguing, they were able to simultaneously side with the state rights 
representatives from the Lower South in opposing the tax without conceding the general 
government’s interest and right to legislate on this and related issues. 
 Though the tax on the transatlantic slave trade was defeated in the end, the debate 
surrounding it raises several interesting questions about the members of Congress’s concern for 
the national character and the role slavery played in the national government and in the 
development of the national character.  All of the representatives of the time seem to have agreed 
that the transatlantic slave trade was wrong and had a negative effect on the national character.  
Many firmly believed that the slave trade reflected poorly on the United States and that other 
nations looked down on the U.S. as a result.  Perhaps this was one reason why so many 
considered the national ban on the transatlantic slave trade in 1808 a foregone conclusion, 
though that had been far from the case when the participants at the Constitutional Convention 
had limited Congress’s power to interfere with the trade until that year.  Even several of those 
who opposed the tax in 1804 expressed their hope and belief that the nation could end the slave 
trade in the not-too-distant future and promised their votes for that measure when the time came. 
 This debate also demonstrates the variety of ways in which members of the House could 
invoke concern for the national character to establish space and opportunity to discuss potentially 
antislavery matters in Congress.  Representatives in 1790 and had already demonstrated the 
utility of invoking the national character to make slavery and antislavery national issues rather 
than state ones; in 1790, focus on national character and national interest had provided the most 
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effective, if still ultimately unsuccessful counter for state rights arguments.  In 1804, the ways in 
which members of the House used national character when discussing slavery and the slave trade 
expanded.  Here, they were not opposing a vocally proslavery block, but debating how best to 
show disapproval of South Carolina’s involvement with the transatlantic slave trade.  While one 
group still based its argument on state sovereignty, both representatives who supported the tax 
and some who opposed it invoked concern for the national character to support their arguments 
while leaving the way open for further discussion of opposition to slavery and the slave trade and 
supporting the idea that the general government had the authority to censure a state’s actions 
when it came to slavery. 
 
 
58 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
“WHAT WILL THE NATIONS OF THE EARTH THINK OF US?”: THE MISSOURI CRISIS 
AND THE NATIONAL CHARACTER 
 
 In the years directly following the close of the transatlantic slave trade in 1808, slavery 
was, for a time, a less pressing issue in national politics.  Despite the diminished attention 
slavery received in Congress, it never entirely disappeared, and it often appeared in debates that, 
on the surface, had little to do with slavery.  One of the areas in which it received increasing 
attention, however, had to do with the expansion of the institution.105  Settlers with a variety of 
motives flocked to the territories, increasing the population in those territories, which, 
eventually, led in turn to territories applying for statehood.  Between 1808 and 1820, five new 
states were admitted to the Union—three states that embraced slavery and two that forbade it—
bringing the total to eleven states where slavery was diminishing or entirely forbidden and eleven 
states that supported slavery.  In 1819, Congress began discussing a bill admitting the state of 
Missouri to the Union.  Almost immediately upon the commencement of the discussion of the 
bill, Representative James Tallmadge of New York proposed an amendment that would restrict 
slavery in Missouri.  The amendment stipulated “That the further introduction of slavery or 
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involuntary servitude be prohibited, except for the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall 
have been fully convicted; and that all children born within the said State, after the admission 
thereof into the Union, shall be free at the age of twenty-five years.”106  In other words, Missouri 
would be required to prohibit the introduction of new slaves to the state and to gradually 
emancipate the slaves currently in the state as a condition of statehood. 
 Tallmadge’s motives for proposing the amendment were and remain unclear.  When 
Tallmadge presented his amendment for the House’s consideration in February of 1819, he had 
been a member of Congress for just over two years, and he was already planning to retire from 
Congress at the end of the session.  During his time in Congress he had done little to distinguish 
himself politically.  He did have an established political antislavery record, though.  In 1817, he 
helped shape New York’s final emancipation law.  A year later, in 1818, Tallmadge urged the 
U.S. House of Representatives to reject Illinois’s application for statehood on the grounds that 
Illinois’s proposed constitution violated the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.  The constitution 
would “permit the hiring of slaves...for any number of years consecutively” and call it indentured 
servitude.107  Tallmadge stated that even if slavery was not adopted in the Illinois constitution in 
so many words, the document did not sufficiently prohibit slavery, either.  While his precise 
motives in suggesting the restriction of slavery in Missouri are unclear, the motion was certainly 
not out of character for Tallmadge.108 
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 No matter what Tallmadge’s motives might have been, the proposed amendment set off 
an explosive debate in the House about the ability of Congress to restrict slavery.109  Quite apart 
from the divisive nature of slavery in politics, those involved in the debate recognized that more 
was at stake than just slavery in Missouri.  John Craig Hammond states, “Northerners 
immediately sensed that Tallmadge’s plan involved much more than the future of Missouri 
slavery....Missouri would set a precedent for the remainder of the vast Louisiana Purchase.”110  
They knew that the decision Congress made about slavery in Missouri would shape the course of 
slavery in all United States territory west of the Mississippi River.  Southerners seem to have 
been similarly cognizant of the implications of the Tallmadge Amendment.  The amendment’s 
supporters, who came almost universally from free northern states, asserted that Congress had 
the right to govern the territories, and Missouri was a territory until admitted as a state.  Those 
who opposed the amendment came primarily from slaveholding states and emphatically argued 
that Congress did not have power to restrict slavery in any sovereign state, which Missouri 
would soon be.   
 Two major questions governed the course of the debates about restricting slavery in 
Missouri.  First, was it constitutional?  Second, was it expedient?  Every member of Congress 
who spoke over the course of the debates centered his response around addressing these 
questions of constitutionality and expediency.  Those who supported the Tallmadge Amendment 
argued that it was both constitutional and expedient, while those who argued against the 
amendment, unsurprisingly, argued the opposite. 
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 When discussing the question of constitutionality, the members of the House focused 
primarily on the issues of Congress’s power in the territories and the powers reserved to the 
states.  Representatives who favored the proposed amendment contended that the Constitution 
gave Congress power to govern the territories and to admit new states to the Union, so by 
extension it gave the general government the power to set conditions for admission.  Essentially, 
they argued, Congress had the power to exert authority over an incoming state to restrict slavery.  
Their opponents insisted that, as the Constitution did not explicitly give Congress power over 
slavery, that power was reserved to the individual states.  This argument was, of course, nothing 
new; men such as Representatives Burke and Baldwin had made the same claim in 1790 when 
opposing the reception and discussion of antislavery petitions.  Slavery, from a strict 
constructionist view of the Constitution, was a matter of state rights; the Tenth Amendment 
reserved the powers not delegated to the general government to the states.  That power to 
legislate concerning slavery was not delegated to the general government by the Constitution 
was the grounds on which most representatives from slaveholding states based their 
constitutional opposition to the Tallmadge Amendment.  Neither those who supported nor those 
who opposed the Tallmadge Amendment were willing to concede the matter of constitutionality, 
and their interpretations of the Constitution remained polar opposites throughout the debates. 
 In addition to this irreconcilable question of whether or not a restriction on slavery was 
constitutional was the question of whether or not such a restriction was expedient.  Even if the 
Constitution gave Congress the power to restrict slavery in Missouri, was it a good, practical, 
idea?  When addressing this question, the representatives drew on a number of relevant 
precedents and ideas to make their cases for their respective positions.  Two documents received 
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frequent mention over the course of the debates: the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and the 
Louisiana Purchase Treaty.  The Northwest Ordinance had stipulated that the territories that 
became Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois would not permit or support slavery within their boundaries.  
Congress had passed the ordinance under the Articles of Confederation, and it had been ratified 
or reinstituted under the Constitution with little opposition.  While Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois 
had all dealt with some internal opposition to the restriction on slavery, all had overcome this 
opposition and had entered the Union with restrictions on slavery.111   
 Proponents of the proposed restriction of slavery in Missouri argued that no one had 
taken exception to the restrictions set in place by the Northwest Ordinance or argued against the 
ordinance’s constitutionality.  In their eyes, Missouri ought to be no different.  Just as the general 
government had possessed the power to restrict slavery in the northwest territories—which had 
become primarily nonslaveholding states—it should have the same power to restrict slavery in 
Missouri.  Representative Clifton Clagett of New Hampshire called the Northwest Ordinance 
“that invaluable ordinance of 1787 “ and pointed out that many of the men who passed the 
ordinance “were among those who formed your Constitution.”  The Northwest Ordinance and 
the Constitution were, Clagett said, based upon the same principles of civil and religious 
liberty.112  Clagett and many others who favored restriction assured the South that they did not 
intend to interfere with slavery where it already existed.  Even the staunchest supporters of the 
Tallmadge Amendment acknowledged that Congress had no right to interfere with slavery in the 
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slaveholding states.  However, the Northwest Ordinance was proof that Congress could stop 
slavery’s spread in the territories. 
 The Tallmadge Amendment’s opponents countered these arguments with the assertion 
that the Northwest Ordinance had been a unique case, carried over from a previous government.  
Missouri, along with all of the territory gained in the Louisiana Purchase, came with its own 
unique set of stipulations regarding statehood.  In the Louisiana Purchase Treaty, the United 
States agreed to admit the purchased territories on an equal footing with all of the existing 
sovereign states.  This, the representatives of the slaveholding states claimed, meant permitting 
Missouri to decide for itself whether or not it would permit slavery, just like the states already 
belonging to the Union.  For Congress to abridge this power would violate the treaty with 
France, as it would make Missouri—and presumably other states that would follow—inferior to 
the existing states.  The representative from Missouri, John Scott, contended that “if the citizens 
of Pennsylvania or Virginia enjoyed the right, in their own State, to decide the question whether 
they would have slavery or not, the citizens of Missouri, to give them the same privileges, must 
have the same right to decide whether they would or would not tolerate slavery in their State.”  If 
Missouri did not have this right, “then the citizens of Pennsylvania and Virginia would have 
more rights, privileges, and powers...than the citizens of Missouri.”  This situation, Scott—and 
others—claimed, would be unjust to the people of Missouri.113 
 The members of the House of Representatives went back and forth on these and related 
issues pertaining to the expediency of Tallmadge’s proposed restriction.  One representative 
pointed out that a restriction would mean nothing, as Missouri, as soon as it became a state, 
could turn around and form a new constitution that permitted slavery, making the restriction 
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pointless.114  Others indicated that slavery already existed in Missouri, so even if Congress 
passed the restriction and Missouri accepted it and became a state, enforcement would always be 
a problem.  Representative Robert Reid of Georgia even presented the possibility that, if 
Congress denied the people of Missouri the right to decide for themselves whether or not to 
permit slavery within their state, they would resist “in proportion to your [Congress’s] 
oppression.”115  There was every possibility that Missouri might rebel if Congress voted to 
restrict slavery there. 
 In the midst of these great questions of the constitutionality and expediency of the 
Tallmadge Amendment, a small group of representatives strove to push back against the state 
rights arguments advanced by representatives from the slaveholding states by expressing concern 
for the effect of slavery on the national character, just as had happened in 1790 and 1804.  They 
reminded the members of the House that the world was watching their nation to see whether it 
would stay true to its republican principles and commitment to liberty.  While invocations of the 
national character never formed the entirety of a representative’s argument, representatives’ 
efforts to draw their colleagues’ attention to the implications of the Tallmadge Amendment for 
the national character provide insight to some of tactics of antislavery advocates in Congress.  As 
members of Congress had done in 1790 and 1804, when confronted with state rights arguments 
against antislavery measures of any kind, those who raised their concerns for the national 
character during the debates over restricting slavery in Missouri did so to push back against the 
argument that slavery was purely a state issue and to assert slavery’s (and antislavery’s) place as 
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a national issue in Congress.  These representatives went further in their efforts to assert general 
government authority over slavery than those in 1804 had done, though.  In 1804, members of 
the House had invoked concern for the national character to justify the general government 
censuring South Carolina for reopening the transatlantic slave trade.  Members of the House in 
1819 and 1820, on the other hand, used concern for the national character to justify the general 
government asserting authority directly over slavery in a soon-to-be sovereign state.  Because 
slavery was so detrimental to the national character, the argument went, the general government 
had a right and a responsibility to check its growth where possible. 
 Tallmadge himself cited a concern for the national character among his reasons for 
proposing the restrictions on slavery in Missouri.  A few days after he proposed the amendment, 
he gave a long speech in defense of his proposal.  He said he had not meant to provoke such 
debate.  Certainly, he did not mean to argue either for or against slavery as a moral right, though, 
he pointed out, “How gladly would the ‘legitimates of Europe chuckle’ to find an American 
Congress in debate on such a question!”116  At a time when Europeans were increasingly coming 
to view slavery as morally wrong, it seemed absurd to debate that point in the general 
government of a nation that prided itself on its liberty.  The representative from New York 
recognized that the subject of slavery was a delicate one.  It tended to raise alarm and even 
concern for their safety among the southern slaveholding states.117  He saw in the admission of 
Missouri, however, an opportunity to set boundaries against slavery’s further expansion.   
 The nation, Tallmadge said, stood at a crossroads between liberty and slavery.  The 
United States was an “extended empire, inhabited by the hardy sons of American freemen,” and 
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by comparison, “the Governments of Europe dwindle into insignificance, and the whole world is 
without a parallel.”  Tallmadge told the members of the House that the nation was currently a 
great empire.  He also offered a warning, however: “reverse this scene; people this fair dominion 
with the slaves of our planters; extend slavery—this bane of man, this abomination of heaven—
over your extended empire, and you prepare its dissolution.”118  If Congress took this opportunity 
to restrict slavery, the nation was well on its way to becoming a greater empire than all the 
nations of Europe.  If, however, the general government failed to act while it had the chance, the 
nation would fall.  “With this defect,” Tallmadge predicted, “your Government must crumble to 
pieces, and your people become the scoff of the world.”119  Instead of becoming a great empire 
that would make the European governments look insignificant, the United States would be an 
object of ridicule and scorn among its peers. 
 Furthermore, Tallmadge was certain that the United States would become “the scoff of 
the world” if it permitted the expansion of slavery.  He reminded Congress that “on this subject 
the eyes of Europe are turned upon you....If you allow slavery to pass into Territories where you 
have the lawful power to exclude it, you will justly take upon yourself all the charges of 
inconsistency.”120  After all, the nation had already been the subject of British censure because of 
the institution of slavery, an institution that seemed inconsistent with human decency and with 
the principles of liberty.121  The United States claimed, by virtue of the Constitution and the 
Declaration of Independence, to be a free country.  In 1776, the United States had declared to the 
world that all men were created equal, yet it permitted the enslavement of a significant number 
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of people.  The existence of slavery in a purportedly free nation exposed the nation to outside 
censure.  If Congress would act against the spread of slavery, however, confining the institution 
to where it existed when the government was established, to states east of the Mississippi River, 
the general government could be acquitted of the stains slavery attached to the national 
character.122 
 Representative Arthur Livermore of New Hampshire, in an earlier speech, had made 
similar claims regarding the opportunity to check the spread of slavery then before the general 
government.  He stated, “An opportunity is now presented, if not to diminish, at least to prevent, 
the growth of a sin which sits heavy on the soul of every one of us.”  According to Livermore, 
Missouri’s impending admission to the Union gave Congress an opportunity to take action 
against slavery in a constitutional manner.  He, like his colleagues, acknowledged that slavery 
must be left alone in the states that supported it, but the Tallmadge Amendment represented 
Congress’s best chance to stop slavery from spreading.  By so doing, Livermore said, “we may 
retrieve the national character, and, in some degree, our own.”  This was a chance for 
redemption, both personal and collective.  The national character, if the nation carried on 
permitting slavery to spread, was in danger; both the national character and the individual 
characters of the members of Congress were tarnished by the existence and increase of slavery in 
the United States.  To act against it was to improve that character.  If Congress could not bring 
itself to act against the spread of slavery in the territories, though, Livermore called upon his 
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colleagues in the House to be consistent “and declare that our Constitution was made to impose 
slavery, and not to establish liberty.”123 
 Scott, the sole representative from Missouri in the House, countered such claims with the 
assertion that the amendment, which its supporters said would uphold the nation’s commitment 
to liberty, would destroy the liberties of the people in Missouri.124  The people of Missouri would 
not be allowed to decide for themselves, as others had, whether or not to permit slavery among 
them.  Despite this and numerous other arguments against the Tallmadge Amendment, though, 
the House narrowly voted in favor of the amendment, and, a few days later, passed the bill on 
Missouri statehood.125 
 If the controversy ended there, it would appear to be a triumph for the opponents of 
slavery.  In late February, however, the Senate returned the bill to the House having approved 
everything except the restrictions on slavery.  After a relatively brief debate that reiterated many 
of the same arguments as before, the House again passed the amendment, and the Senate again 
rejected it, putting the Senate and the House at an impasse.126 Shortly thereafter, Congress 
adjourned, effectively killing the bill for Missouri statehood.127 
 The House resumed discussion of Missouri statehood in December 1819, and though 
Tallmadge was not longer present, the same issues that had plagued the previous Congress 
dominated the debates.  The proposal to restrict slavery in Missouri again raised questions of 
constitutionality and expediency that largely dictated the terms of the debates, with each side 
determined to show that its position was the constitutional position and would best serve the 
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nation.  Unlike during the debates of several months previous, some representatives began to hint 
that the debates had gone on too long, and others began to suggest that a compromise would be 
necessary.128  The majority, however, stayed focused on arguing that the proposed restrictions 
were constitutional and expedient or that they were unconstitutional and inexpedient. 
 Some of the restriction’s supporters again chose to invoke concern for the national 
character to support their arguments.  Representative John Taylor of New York gave a long 
speech in favor of the restrictions in which he expressed concern for others’ perceptions of the 
general government if Congress failed to act against the expansion of slavery west of the 
Mississippi.  Like other supporters of the proposed amendment, he argued in favor of the 
constitutionality of the measure, basing his argument upon the powers of Congress to make rules 
regarding the territories and to admit new states to the Union.  More significant for his argument, 
though, was a discussion of Congress’s responsibility concerning slavery.  Taylor asserted, 
“Possessing, as we do, both a moral and Constitutional right to require of Missouri a provision 
against slavery, as a condition of her admission, if we fail to exert it, we shall justly incur the 
reproach of our contemporaries, and the malediction of posterity.”129  If Congress failed to act 
against slavery where it had the constitutional right to do so, Taylor said, those with their eyes on 
the United States, waiting for the nation to uphold its avowed dedication to liberty, would be 
right to reproach the nation.  Additionally, their own posterity would have that same right.  The 
nation’s character mattered not just for the present, but for the future, as well.  The character the 
general government established by its actions was the one future generations would inherit, 
whether for good or ill. 
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 Representative Clifton Clagett of New Hampshire presented his concern for the national 
character in stronger language than Taylor had.  After establishing his view of slavery as a great 
evil, he asked pointedly, “What will the nations of the earth think of us?”130  If the general 
government of the United States permitted slavery to extend across the entirety of the nation, a 
territory he was certain would span the entire distance between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, 
this would reflect poorly on the nation in the eyes of its fellow nations.  Clagett suggested that 
Congress should “close the door against this great evil, and evince to an attentive world that we 
are just, as well as free.”131  The world was paying attention to the debates taking place in the 
U.S. House of Representatives and would judge the nation based on the House’s actions.  It was 
the responsibility of the United States, in the spotlight as the nation was, to uphold the principles 
upon which it had been founded.  Clagett identified these principles for any of his colleagues 
who might be in doubt as to what they were: “civil and religious liberty, [and] the rights of 
man.”132  The perpetuation and, more particularly, the extension of slavery constituted a clear 
departure from these principles, particularly a departure from civil liberty and the rights of man, 
for Clagett.  If the nation chose to permit slavery to spread to the territory west of the 
Mississippi, it would signal to the world that the United States was no longer built upon 
principles of liberty. 
 Representative Daniel Cook of Illinois also spoke in favor of restricting slavery in 
Missouri.  Only a few years previous, a proslavery faction in Illinois had agitated for the repeal 
of Article VI of the Northwest Ordinance, the part of the law prohibiting slavery in the territories 
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of the northwest.  They had made efforts to have their state admitted to the Union with no 
restrictions on slavery, and while these efforts had ultimately not prevailed, Illinois had a bit of a 
complicated relationship with slavery.133  Cook no doubt considered such complications and the 
legacy of his own state as he spoke in favor of restricting slavery in Missouri.  There was nothing 
complicated about Cook’s position, though; he did not hesitate to call slavery an evil and a 
misfortune.  While he claimed that he believed the proposed restriction against slavery in 
Missouri was constitutional, he also asserted that he would support restriction no matter what 
because that was what best for the country.  Slavery had a pernicious influence on society; “The 
love of ease and pleasure are the scions which shoot from the root of slavery,” Cook asserted.  
“The more they are extended, therefore, the more will this canker spread, so fatal to liberty, and 
the more difficult will it be to effect their manumission.”134  Spreading slavery would spread an 
infection throughout the nation, one that would, in the end, destroy the liberty of the nation and 
the nation’s people.135 
 Cook asserted that the United States had set itself up as an example to the world.  He 
declared, “we have attempted to plant in the American soil the principles of free and republican 
government; we have attempted to set an example to the world of the capacity of man to govern 
himself, and of securing to all the enjoyment of equal rights.”136  This was the nation’s goal and 
its role in the world: it was to be an example of self-government and equality.  However, Cook 
pointed out, “the brilliancy of this example abroad is too much darkened by the gloom which 
slavery spreads over it, and while we continue to spread that gloom, the happy influence of 
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republican government will continue to be weakened, till ultimately, like the sun, whose rays are 
obstructed by an impenetrable cloud, its influence will be entirely lost.”137  For Cook, slavery 
overshadowed the example the nation was intended to set.  The existence of slavery anywhere in 
the nation contributed to the cloud obscuring the brilliance of that example.  To let it spread, 
Cook claimed, would be to let darkness overtake light, to ultimately experience the failure of the 
United States’ republican experiment, and to lose the nation’s standing in the world.  To prevent 
the fate Cook considered so lamentable, it was up to the general government to prove that 
slavery only existed in the nation because it had been forced upon it before its founding.  And 
what if the government allowed slavery to spread, Cook asked.  Surely it would indicate that 
slavery existed in the United States not by necessity only, but also by choice.  If the general 
government was to show itself consistent with the nation’s founding principles, it must restrict 
slavery’s extension; it was, Cook claimed, what was owed “to the character of our 
Government.”138  
 Representative Joseph Hemphill of Pennsylvania agreed with Cook about the effects of 
slavery on the nation.  He asked Congress, “What can more directly attack the welfare of society 
than to hold a race of people in bondage?”  Hemphill compared the enslavement of people of 
African descent to the enslavement of Native Americans in New York, or any other state, for that 
matter.  If a state chose to enslave the native peoples within its borders, the rest of the nation 
would likely be outraged.  It would be an offense against “divine and human justice.”139  
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Slavery—racial slavery—had a negative effect on society, and the right to hold slaves, Hemphill 
concluded, was not a right at all.  and to assert otherwise flew in the face of justice.   
 Quite apart from the moral and social arguments, however, there were political issues to 
consider, and Hemphill was convinced that if Congress did not restrict slavery in Missouri, it 
would never have the power and authority to do so elsewhere, either.  This issue of restricting 
slavery in Missouri was, in Hemphill’s eyes, “one of the highest character, as it regards the honor 
and future prosperity of this country.”  Halting the spread of slavery was, to him, a matter of the 
nation’s prosperity and honor—its character.  Threats that the Union would dissolve, which had 
made an appearance more than once over the course of the debates, were not likely to be carried 
out, nor were they justified.  Hemphill asserted, “I have a more exalted opinion of the patriotism 
of the South; they will never cause American blood to be spilt, unless for reasons that would 
justify them in the eyes of the world.”  To shed American blood in defense of the institution of 
slavery was, to Hemphill, completely unjustified in the world’s eyes; the world sided with those 
who wished to check the spread of slavery.140 
 Hemphill’s fellow Pennsylvanian John Sergeant was even more explicit in his concern 
for the national character.  He directly attacked the argument that slavery was a matter of state 
rights, stating that a state was “the creature of the Constitution; deriving from the Constitution its 
existence and all its rights, and possessing no power but what is imparted to it by the 
Constitution.”  This being the case, “If it have a power to establish slavery, it derives that power 
from the Constitution, and the Constitution becomes stained with the sin of having originated a 
state of slavery.”141  If states could establish slavery, then the Constitution itself established, 
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upheld, and perpetuated slavery.  Many southern representatives would have had no problem 
with this interpretation of the Constitution; several had claimed during these debates and earlier 
that the Constitution protected slavery.  Representatives from the Lower South had made that 
argument during the debates about the antislavery petitions in 1790.142  This would be a sad 
reflection upon the Constitution, though, Sergeant said.  Such an argument was, in his view, 
“calculated to diminish the sacred regard that has been felt for it here and abroad.”143  Even those 
who resided outside the United States, who did not fall under the rule of the Constitution, held 
the document in high regard.  Claiming that a state could decide to establish slavery by virtue of 
the Constitution damaged that regard. 
 More than the nature or integrity of the Constitution was at stake in this matter, according 
to Sergeant.  There was no question in his mind that the European nations would reproach the 
United States for the inconsistencies between the nation’s stated principles and its actions 
regarding slavery.  This certainty stemmed from recent experience, as Britain had rebuked the 
United States on this very issue.  Sergeant’s fellow antislavery Pennsylvanian, Robert Walsh, in 
his Appeal, acknowledged that slavery was the weakest point in the nation’s character.144  With 
this vulnerability in mind, Sergeant stated,  
When Europeans reproach us with our negro slavery; when they contrast our republican 
boast and pretensions with the existence of this condition among us, we have our answer 
ready—it is to you we owe this evil; you planted it here, and it has taken such root in the 
soil that we have not the power to eradicate it.  Then, turning to the West, and directing 
their attention to Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, we can proudly tell them these are the 
offspring of our policy and our laws, these are the free productions of the Constitution of 
the United States.145 
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Slavery in the states where it currently existed, Sergeant claimed, could be blamed entirely upon 
the Europeans who had colonized the land.  The Americans had inherited the institution from 
Europe and were not in a position to do away with it where it already existed.  This removed any 
reproach from the slaveholding states—it was Europe’s fault, not theirs, that they were 
dependent upon slave labor.  If Congress permitted slavery to expand beyond that area where 
slavery was already established, however, it would be a different situation.  If the general 
government allowed slavery to expand west of the Mississippi, the United States, not the nations 
of Europe, would be responsible for that “dark spot upon the face of the new creation.”146  The 
United States could no longer claim to be beyond reproach in this matter.  To prevent this, 
Sergeant proposed, “Let us give to the world a new pledge of our sincerity.  Let the standard of 
freedom be planted in Missouri, by the hands of the Constitution, and let its banner wave over 
the heads of none but freemen.”  Renewing the nation’s dedication to freedom in such a visible 
way would keep it above the reproach of Europe.  “Then,” said Sergeant, “as our republican 
States extend, republican principles will go hand in hand with republican practice—the love of 
liberty with the sense of justice.”147 
   These discussions of national character played an important role in asserting the national 
importance of slavery.  Just as in 1790 and 1804, the representatives who used national character 
did so in opposition to the claims of many representatives from slaveholding states that slavery 
was rightfully a state issue.  The opponents of the Tallmadge Amendment made a case for 
making slavery about state rights in order to defeat the proposed restrictions on slavery in 
Missouri, attempting to close off the possibility of further discussion of antislavery measures in 
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Congress.  Representatives who supported the Tallmadge Amendment combated this attempt in 
part by tying antislavery to concern for the national character.  In 1790, such tactics had helped 
to create a space for the discussion of antislavery goals in Congress.  When debating taxing the 
transatlantic slave trade in 1804, several representatives had taken this to a new level by using 
concern for the national character to support the general government censuring a state for 
involvement in the trade.  Now, in the debates over slavery in Missouri, representatives had 
taken yet another step in their use of the national character.  Like the representatives in 1790 and 
1804, these men used concern for the national character to support their position that slavery was 
a national issue, not solely a state one.  These members of the House used this, though, to make a 
case for general government interference in slavery in an incoming state.  This went beyond even 
censure.  It was the culmination of two decades of striving to make slavery a national issue based 
on concern for the nation’s character. 
 In the end, neither those who favored restricting slavery nor those who opposed it got 
everything they wanted; the heated debates about the restriction of slavery in Missouri ended in 
compromise.  While Congress had been debating the terms of Missouri statehood at length, 
Maine had also applied for statehood.  The Senate linked the admission of Maine and Missouri, 
then amended the statehood bill to admit Maine as a state without slaves and Missouri with no 
legal restrictions on slavery.  This kept a balance between the number of restrictionist states and 
the number of anti-restrictionist states in the nation. The Senate bill also prohibited slavery in the 
Louisiana Territory north of Missouri’s southern border.  The bill passed in the Senate, but it was 
defeated in the House.   
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 Despite the bill’s defeat, however, its measures largely constituted what became the 
Missouri Compromise.  At the end of February 1820, the House agreed to a joint conference with 
the Senate concerning the crisis.  This resulted in a bill that looked much like the Senate’s earlier 
one.  Knowing the House would never pass the compromise in its entirety, Henry Clay, the 
Speaker of the House, contrived to have the bill broken into pieces to be voted on separately.  In 
the end, the individual parts of the compromise did pass, settling for a generation the issue of 
slavery in the territories.148 
 With the passage of the Missouri Compromise, the debate about slavery in the territories 
faded from discussion.  The place of slavery and antislavery in Congress remained unresolved, 
though.  Since the issue first arose in the House of Representatives in 1790, many 
representatives, primarily from the Lower South, though increasingly from other slaveholding 
states, had argued that the Constitution gave Congress no authority over slavery and only limited 
authority over the slave trade.  For this reason, the representatives claimed, slavery and the slave 
trade were state issues, not national ones.  During this same period, several representatives strove 
to counter this argument by establishing the impact of slavery on the nation as a whole.  One way 
they did this was to argue that slavery and the slave trade negatively impacted the national 
character, or the nation’s reputation in the Atlantic world, using this argument to justify 
attempting to exert increasing amounts of general government authority over slavery.   
 This pattern held true in the debates over restricting slavery in Missouri.  As in 1790 and 
1804, slaveholders and their allies reminded their colleagues in the House of Representatives that 
powers not expressly delegated to the general government in the Constitution were reserved to 
the individual states, invoking state rights in defense of slavery.  They strove to establish that 
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Congress had no constitutional power to act against slavery in the ways proposed.  And as part of 
their efforts to defend the Tallmadge Amendment and restriction of slavery in Missouri, 
members of the House of Representatives used claims about slavery’s impact on the national 
character to resist the state rights arguments and justify national interest in and general 
government authority over certain aspects of slavery.  Though Congress ultimately decided to 
permit Missouri to enter the Union with no restrictions on slavery, representatives’ expressions 
of concern for the national character helped to shape the debates on the issue and on the future of 
the general government’s relations with slavery and antislavery. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 Between the ratification of the Constitution and the Missouri Crisis, slavery played a 
significant role in the politics of the new nation, a role that has gained greater attention in the 
past few decades.  From 1790, when it had not yet been entirely established that slavery had any 
role in the business of the general government, to 1804, when the representatives from 
slaveholding and non-slaveholding states alike eagerly looked forward to the day that Congress 
could act against the transatlantic slave trade, to 1819 and 1820, when the issue of slavery in one 
state nearly tore the nation in two, the issues of slavery and the slave trade generated a great deal 
of discussion in the House of Representatives.  In these discussions, the idea of national 
character played an important part, legitimizing the discussion of slavery and the entertainment 
of antislavery measures in Congress.   
 In 1790, a few representatives used the ideas of national character and national interest to 
establish a space for discussion of slavery and the slave trade in Congress.  In 1804, members of 
the House invoked the concept of national character to argue both for and against imposing a tax 
on slave importations following South Carolina’s decision to reopen the transatlantic slave trade, 
with the goal of showing the general government’s disapproval of this state action.  In 1819 and 
1820, as the nation exploded over the question of Missouri’s admission to the Union, 
congressional supporters of slavery’s restriction used the idea of the national character as part of 
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a larger argument against an anti-restrictionist attempt to make slavery purely a state issue and to 
legitimize opposition to the expansion of slavery in the United States.  These congressmen strove 
to impose general government authority over slavery in an incoming state to stop the spread of 
slavery in the nation. 
 During these three debates, slaveholding representatives, primarily from the Lower 
South, attempted to call into question the general government’s right to discuss slavery and, 
more particularly, antislavery.  They based their positions on a number of constitutional 
arguments, as well as day-to-day considerations of the effects proposed measures would have.  
Many of these men saw slavery and access to the transatlantic slave trade as protected rights in 
which the general government could not interfere, and they strove to put as many safeguards for 
these rights in place as possible.  While their opponents employed a variety of tactics in 
opposition to these efforts, connecting slavery and the slave trade to the national character 
proved one particularly effective means of keeping the issues in the national dialogue, 
legitimizing them as national issues and making a case for exercising general government 
authority over them. 
 Discussion of national character in congressional debates about slavery in the early 
republic also highlights how Americans thought about their nation.  Their expressions of concern 
about what other nations would think about them demonstrate a preoccupation with the United 
States’ place among the nations of the Atlantic world.  That preoccupation shaped the nation’s 
approach to slavery and the relationship between slavery and the general government.  
Understanding the ways in which the members of the U.S. House of Representatives used the 
sense that other nations were watching the nation as a political tool also provides greater insight 
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to disagreements concerning the balance between state and national power following the 
ratification of the Constitution.  Finally, examining congressional debates about slavery through 
the lens of national character provides additional perspective on the complicated relationship 
between slavery and the founding principles of the United States embodied in the Declaration of 
Independence and the Constitution and shows how contested this topic was in national politics in 
the decades following the Revolution. 
 In 1819, Robert Walsh wrote that the British had said the United States as a nation was 
“below the least and lowest of the European nations in the scale of wisdom and virtue” because 
of its involvement with slavery.149  American slavery gave Europeans cause to cast aspersion on 
the national character of the United States.  It was concern for the national character, though, 
fueled in part by such accusations, that gave legitimacy to the antislavery cause in Congress in 
the early American republic. 
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